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ÖZET 
Bir IP ağı, üzerinde pek çok uygulama çalışan ve çok sayıda kullanıcısı olan çok 
sayıda yönlendirici ve sunumcudan oluşur. Ağ teknolojileri gelişip daha karmaşık 
hale geldikçe, servis sağlayıcılar müşteri isteklerini karşılamak ve performans ve 
maliyet açısından optimize etmek için heterojen  ve dağıtık mimariler kurmaktadır.  
Bu tür sistemlerin yönetimleri çok iyi ağ yöneticileri için bile son derece zor bir hale 
gelmiştir. Bugün ağ yöneticileri günlük hayattaki ihtiyaçları makine diline 
çevirmekle yükümlüdür. Bu cihazların her birini ayrı ayrı yönetmektense, hepsinin 
anlayacağı ortak bir dil oluşturmak çok daha mantıklı bir çözümdür. Bunu sağlayan 
sistemlere “Strateji Tabanlı Ağ Yönetim Sistemi (PBM)” denmektedir.  
PBM sistemlerinin sunduğu hizmetler, ağ yöneticisi için bir yönetim konsolu, 
kuralları saklamak için bir veri deposu, kuralları depolanabilir bir hale getiren bir 
karar merkezi ve yönetilecek düğümler üzerinde bir strateji uygulama noktasıdır. 
Bu tez yönetim sistemlerinin uygulama noktaları üzerine yoğunlaşmıştır. Tezin 
amacı kimi strateji uygulama sistemlerinin uygulama noktası tasarımlarını incelemek 
ve Police yönetim sistemi ile birlikte çalışacak bir uygulama noktası tasarımı yapmak 
ve kodlamaktır.  
Police  kendine ait nesne tabanlı bir dili ve strateji gönderme ve uygulama metodu 
olan dağıtık bir yönetim sistemidir ve Taner Dursun ve Prof. Dr. Bülent Örencik 
tarafından İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi‟nde geliştirilmiştir. 
POLICE dili güvenlik ve yönetim stratejilerini destekler ve diğer sistemlerden farklı 
olarak stratejilerin uygulanma metodu her tür strateji için aynıdır. Temel olarak 
“izin” ve “emir” olmak üzere iki çeşit kural vardır. Literatürde bu stratejiler pozitif 
ve negatif olmak üzere ikiye ayrılmaktadır ancak POLICE‟de basitliği sağlamak 
üzere bu ayrımdan kaçınılmıştır.  
İzin stratejileri sistemdeki bir nesnenin diğer bir nesne üzerinde belirli bir işlemi 
yapıp, yapamayacağını beliler. Emir stratejileri ise bir nesnenin yapmak zorunda 
olduğu işlemleri belirtir. 
 Police bileşenleri şunlardır: 
 Strateji sunumcusu: Strateji yönetiminden sorumludur. Strateji nesnelerini 
saklar ve uygulama noktalarına gönderir.  
 Yönetim arayüzü: Ağ yöneticisinin strateji kurallarını belirlemesini ve uç 
noktaları gözlemlemesini sağlar. Yöneticinin stratejileri doğru yazmasına 
yardımcı olur. 
 Uygulama noktaları: Strateji Kontrol Birimi ile sonlanır ve stratejilerin 
yönetilen düğümlere gönderilmesini ve orada uygulanmasını sağlar. 
 Sistem bilgi modeli: Sistemin bütün bilgilerini depolar. 
Police uygulama noktası bileşenleri: 
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 Strateji Kontrol Birimi: Strateji kurallarını merkezden alır, veri tabanında 
saklar ve Olay Servisi ile iletişimde bulunarak yönetilen düğümlere gönderir. 
 Mesaj Servisi İstemcisi: Sistem içindeki uygulamalar doğrudan 
haberleşmezler, bir sunumcu üzerinden haberleşirler Police‟de Java 
Mesajlaşma Servisi (JMS) Sunumcusu ve İstemcileri kullanılmaktadır. 
 Strateji Gönderme Servis Temsilcisi: Strateji gönderme merkezinden gelen 
kuralları ilk alan birimdir, bu kuralları daha sonra Strateji Kontrol Birimine 
gönderir. 
 Olay Servisi: Yönetilen düğümlerdeki ve gerekli durumlarda uzak 
düğümlerdeki olayları toplar ve Strateji Kontrol Birimini bu konuda 
bilgilendirir. 
 Yönetilen Düğüm Arayüzü: Yönetilen birim ile Strateji Uygulama Noktası 
arasındaki arabirimdir. 
 Kaynak Kontrol Birimi: İzin stratejileri için Strateji Kontrol Birimleri ile 
yönetilen düğümler arasında bir arayüzdür. 
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SUMMARY 
A typical IP network consists of a large number of routers and servers running a 
variety of applications that are used by a large number of users. As the network 
technologies become more and more complex the network providers have to merge a 
set of heterogeneous networking technologies, distributed applications and systems 
in order to fulfill customer needs as well as optimizing the physical network in terms 
of performances and costs.  
Consequently, the management of such information technology resources becomes 
increasingly complex to managers even with a very strong skill. Network managers 
today must translate business objectives into specific operational behaviors within 
the network infrastructure to ensure that network resources are allocated in 
accordance with business needs. Configuring a high number of routers, bridges, or 
servers by generic rules instead of individual configuration appears to be less 
complex, less error-prone and more flexible. Policy Based Management (PBM) 
Systems gets the high level rules compiles and send the to the network nodes and 
enforces these rules at the node. 
Policy Based Management Systems are being developed to serve a Policy 
Management Tool (a Policy Console), a Policy Server (Policy Decision Point - PDP), 
a Policy Repository and a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). 
This thesis aims to define Policy Enforcement of Policy Based Networks, presents 
the architecture and implementation of Police Policy Enforcement Point “Police 
PEP” and gives an analysis of some other PBM systems‟ PEPs.  
Police is a Policy Based Network Management Framework composed of a policy 
specification language and its deployment and management models for policy 
distribution in distributed systems. It is developed by Taner Dursun and Prof. Dr. 
Bulent Orencik at Istanbul Technical University.  
Police has an object-oriented language for specifying both security and management 
policies for distributed systems. Unlike many other policy specification notations, 
uniform enforcement for all kind of policies makes the Police framework simpler. It 
uses two basic policy types: authorizations and obligations. In Literature, these two 
classes can be further divided into positive and negative policies. However, negative 
policies are eliminated to handle policy conflicts easily. Although negative policies 
complicate enforcement process, there are reasons to support them. 
Authorization (cando) Policies are designed to give permissions to actors to run some 
actions on other system objects. Obligation (mustdo) Policies define what actions an 
actor must do if the conditions specified in the policy are met or certain events occur. 
POLICE components are: 
 Policy Server acts as the interface to policy management, which stores 
compiled policy classes, creates and distributes new policies and otherwise 
supports policy management coordination. Policy Management Service 
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creates deployment objects. Policy Deployment Service (PDS) coordinates 
the distribution of the deployment objects to the PEPs. 
 The Management Console (MC) provides a graphical interface for specifying, 
reviewing and modifying policies. Being integrated with Domain Service and 
Police Compiler, the MC helps the administrator to define valid policies 
conforming to both object model of the whole system and the language 
syntax.  
 Enforcement agents, termed Policy Controllers (PCs) are responsible for 
enforcement of both authorization and obligation type policies. 
 Whole information related to the managed system, stored in Domain Service, 
is called as System‟s Information Model (SIM). 
Police Enforcement components are: 
 Policy Controller: Policy Controller (PC) is the unit which is responsible for 
the receiving of the policies from the Policy Deployment Service, storing 
them in the DataBase and communication with the Event Service (ES) for 
Policy Gauge (PG). 
 Messaging Service Client: Rather than communicating directly with each 
other, the components in an application based around a message service send 
messages to a message server. The message server, in turn, delivers the 
messages to the specified recipients. JMS is used for messaging. 
 Policy Deployment Service Agent: Policy Deployment Service Agent 
receives the policy objects sent by Policy Deployment Service via messaging 
service, and sends them to Policy Controller. 
 Event Service: The Event Service collects and composes events from the 
managed nodes and from Event Services of other PEPs, and forwards them to 
the registered PCs which are executing policies. 
 Node Management Interface: Node Management Interface (NMI), which is a 
mediation layer, provides a standard interface between the PEP and the 
embedded hardware and software. 
 Resource Controller: Resource Controller is the unit which acts as an 
interface between the PCs and the managed objects for the authorization 
policies. 
 DataBase used to store the policies. 
 
 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
As the IP networks consist of a large number network devices and servers running a 
variety of applications and users and the network technologies become more and 
more complex, the network administration is becoming more complex too. Providers 
have to merge a set of heterogeneous networking technologies, distributed 
applications and systems in order to fulfill customer needs as well as optimizing the 
physical network in terms of performances and costs.  
Translating business objectives into specific operational behaviors within the 
network infrastructure is getting harder for the managers even with a very strong 
skill. Configuring a high number of routers, bridges, or servers by generic rules 
instead of individual configuration appears to be less complex, less error-prone and 
more flexible. Policy Based Management (PBM) Systems gets the high level rules 
compiles and send the to the network nodes and enforces these rules at the node. 
A typical PBM system includes a Policy Management Tool (Policy Console), a 
Policy Repository, a Policy Decision Point (Policy Server) and a Policy Enforcement 
Point (PEP).  
The policy management tool mainly provides a console to interact with the human 
administrator and allows writing high-level policies; compiles the entered policies, 
checks the syntax and stores them in a repository. 
The policy repository is a data store where the policies are stored by the policy 
management tool and retrieved by policy decision points or policy enforcement 
points. The repository provides the central location that drives the operations of the 
entire network. 
Policy Decision Point (also known as Policy Server) retrieves the policies from 
policy repository and transforms them in format that the policy enforcement points 
can understand. Then PDP sends the lower level policies to the related PEPs. 
The Policy Enforcement Point represents the component that always runs on the 
policy aware node. It is the point at which policy decisions are actually enforced. 
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Policy enforcement point is the PBM system component which is responsible for the 
receiving of policies from PDP and enforcing these policies to the target managed 
device that the PEP supports. 
One PBM system is Police that is composed of a policy specification language and 
its deployment and management models for policy distribution in distributed 
systems. It is developed by Taner Dursun and Prof. Dr. Bulent Orencik at Istanbul 
Technical University.  
Police has an object-oriented language for specifying both security and management 
policies for distributed systems. Unlike many other policy specification notations, 
uniform enforcement for all kind of policies makes the Police framework simpler. It 
uses two basic policy types: authorizations and obligations. In Literature, these two 
classes can be further divided into positive and negative policies. However, negative 
policies are eliminated to handle policy conflicts easily. Although negative policies 
complicate enforcement process, there are reasons to support them. 
Authorization (cando) Policies are designed to give permissions to actors to run some 
actions on other system objects. Obligation (mustdo) Policies define what actions an 
actor must do if the conditions specified in the policy are met or certain events occur. 
POLICE components are: 
 Policy Server acts as the interface to policy management, which stores 
compiled policy classes, creates and distributes new policies and otherwise 
supports policy management coordination. Policy Management Service 
creates deployment objects. Policy Deployment Service (PDS) coordinates 
the distribution of the deployment objects to the PEPs. 
 The Management Console (MC) provides a graphical interface for specifying, 
reviewing and modifying policies. Being integrated with Domain Service and 
Police Compiler, the MC helps the administrator to define valid policies 
conforming to both object model of the whole system and the language 
syntax.  
 Enforcement agents, termed Policy Controllers (PCs) are responsible for 
enforcement of both authorization and obligation type policies. 
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Whole information related to the managed system, stored in Domain Service, is 
called as System‟s Information Model (SIM). 
This thesis is interested in policy enforcement of management systems; it analyzes 
different enforcement mechanisms and presents the Policy Enforcement Point 
architecture and implementation of Police Policy Based Network Management 
Framework. 
1.1 Thesis Contributions 
In this thesis, policy enforcement of management systems is studied.  
Some well known PBM systems, Ponder, Script MIB, Active PBM, HP OpenView 
and IP HighWay OPS are researched and enforcement mechanisms of these systems 
are analyzed.  
A Policy Enforcement Point is designed and implemented to be interoperable with 
the Police PBM system. This policy enforcement point is named PPEP (Police Policy 
Enforcement Point). 
PPEP is compared to the other systems‟ enforcement points which are researched. 
PPEP includes the following components: 
 Policy Controller: Policy Controller (PC) is the unit which is responsible for 
the receiving of the policies from the Policy Deployment Service, storing 
them in the DataBase and communication with the Event Service (ES) for 
Policy Gauge (PG). 
 Messaging Service Client: Rather than communicating directly with each 
other, the components in an application based around a message service send 
messages to a message server. The message server, in turn, delivers the 
messages to the specified recipients. JMS is used for messaging. 
 Policy Deployment Service Agent: Policy Deployment Service Agent 
receives the policy objects sent by Policy Deployment Service via messaging 
service, and sends them to Policy Controller. 
 Event Service: The Event Service collects and composes events from the 
managed nodes and from Event Services of other PEPs, and forwards them to 
the registered PCs which are executing policies. 
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 Node Management Interface: Node Management Interface (NMI), which is a 
mediation layer, provides a standard interface between the PEP and the 
embedded hardware and software. 
 Resource Controller: Resource Controller is the unit which acts as an 
interface between the PCs and the managed objects for the authorization 
policies. 
Node management interface of PPEP is not completely designed, and it is only 
simulated in the implementation. The detailed architecture of node management 
interface is being developed in Sakarya University by Hasan Er. 
1.2  Thesis organization 
Chapter 2 describes general architecture of Policy Based Management and main 
components of a PBM system as well as the aims of PBM and different approaches 
to some concepts.   
Chapter 3 aims to describe “Police” which is a PBM Framework designed by Taner 
Dursun as Ph. D. Thesis. Police Policy Definition Language and architectural 
analysis of Police is given in this chapter.  
In Chapter 4 Enforcement Mechanisms of different management systems are studied. 
These are PONDER, Script MIB (Management Information Base), Active PBM, HP 
OpenView PolicyXpert and IPHighway Open Policy System (OPS). 
In Chapter 5, design of Police PEP, the Policy Enforcement Point of Police, is given 
in detail and a comparison of Police PEP with the PEPs of the systems described in 
Chapter 4, is included. 
Chapter 6 gives the details and results of implementation. 
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2 POLICY BASED MANAGEMENT 
A typical IP network consists of a large number of routers and servers running a 
variety of applications that are used by a large number of users. Some of these 
applications (such as the applications implementing the routing protocols) are needed 
for proper operation of the IP networks, and the other applications, such as Web 
servers or mail servers, are deployed for a specific purpose. Although individual 
configurations of the IP network vary from organization to organization, it is safe to 
assume that the different applications and users in the network interact with each 
other in a complex and subtle manner. The applications compete with each other to 
access network resources, such as the bandwidth on different links, the buffer space 
in routers, encryption facilities for secure communication, processing cycles at 
servers, etc.   
As the network technologies become more and more complex the network providers 
have to merge a set of heterogeneous networking technologies, distributed 
applications and systems in order to fulfill customer needs as well as optimizing the 
physical network in terms of performances and costs.  
Consequently, the management of such information technology resources becomes 
increasingly complex to managers even with a very strong skill. Network managers 
today must translate business objectives into specific operational behaviors within 
the network infrastructure to ensure that network resources are allocated in 
accordance with business needs. It is not practical to control the network 
infrastructure manually, so configuring a high number of routers, bridges, or servers 
by generic rules instead of individual configuration appears to be less complex, less 
error-prone and more flexible. The rising technology which gets the policies, creates 
these generic rules, stores and enforces them is called “Policy Based Management”.  
Policy based management is an administrative approach that is used to simplify the 
management of a given strategy by establishing policies to deal with situations that 
are likely to occur. Policies are operating rules that can be referred to as a means of 
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maintaining order, security, consistency, or other ways of successfully furthering a 
goal or mission [1]. 
In the computing world, policy based management is used as an administrative tool 
throughout an enterprise or a network, or on workstations that have multiple users or 
network devices like routers, firewalls, Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) etc. Policy 
based management includes policy based network management, the use of policies to 
control access to and priorities for the use of resources. Policy based management 
may be used in systems management, or the creation and operation of an efficient 
computing environment. 
2.1 Policy Based Management System Components 
A typical PBM system includes a Policy Management Tool (Policy Console), a 
Policy Repository, a Policy Server (Policy Decision Point) and a Policy Enforcement 
Point (PEP), as shown in Figure 2.1. The Policy Server talks to the PEP through a 
protocol such as Common Open Policy Service (COPS), Simple Network 
Management Protocol (SNMP) etc. The data processed by a PBM is the policy. 
Policies are business objects translated into sets of rules that are represented as data 
structures [2].  
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Figure 2.1 General Architecture for a PBM System  
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2.1.1 Policy 
There are a lot of definitions for policies from academic and commercial 
communities. According to IETF RFC3198 "Policy" can be defined from two 
perspectives: 
 A definite goal, course or method of action to guide and determine present 
and future decisions.  "Policies" are implemented or executed within a 
particular context (such as policies defined within a business unit) [3].  
 Policies as a set of rules to administer, manage, and control access to network 
resources [4]. 
Storage Networking Industry Assoc‟s (SNIA) defines policy as: 
 “The measurable, enforceable and realizable specification of method, action 
and/or desired state that meets service requirements in a storage-based 
information infrastructure." 
 A means of extending the functionality of management systems 
dynamically  
 Guides the behavior of a network or distributed system through high-level 
declarative directives 
 dynamically introduced, checked for consistency, refined and evaluated 
 resulting typically in a series of low-level actions 
In order for policies to be active in the network, an administrator needs to define 
them, and the devices need to enforce them. For a smooth operation of the network, 
the policies must satisfy several requirements [5]:  
 Precision. A policy must be precise and specified to a level of detail that can 
be understood by a network element. There should be no ambiguity regarding 
a policy‟s interpretation. From the point of view of a network element, the 
policy must be specified with all the requisite details that might be needed for 
the enforcement of a policy.  
 Consistency. The set of policies that is given to a network element or to all 
the network elements in the network must be consistent. For example, if two 
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firewalls are encrypting secure traffic among themselves, they must be 
configured to use a set of algorithms and keys that both can use to 
interoperate. 
 Compatibility. The set of policies that is given to a network element must be 
compatible with the capabilities that the network element can support. For 
example, many routers in the network look at the network layer header in the 
packet, so the policy must be specified to such a network element in terms 
that include a network layer header field.  
 Mutual consistency. If multiple policies are specified for a network element, 
they must be consistent with each other. The network element should be able 
to apply these policies in an unambiguous manner. The set of policies should 
not specify a conflicting action be taken. At the very least, if conflicting 
policies are found, the network element should be able to determine 
unambiguously the policy that should be selected among all the possible 
choices.  
 Ease of specification. In order for a network administrator to specify policies, 
a policy must be simple and easy to specify. A network operator must be able 
to specify the policies with the minimum effort required to specify a 
consistent and precise set.  
 Intuitiveness. In order for the network operator to specify policies, policy 
definition must be done in terms that are familiar to the network operator. 
These terms might require that policies be defined in terms of the business 
processes or concepts that are commonly used within an organization. A 
network operator might find it much easier to specify a policy in terms of an 
application, such as payroll processing, rather than in terms of the machine 
addresses and header fields that are used by the payroll application.  
It is clear that all these requirements cannot be optimally satisfied together 
simultaneously. For a specification that is intuitive, the policy must be specified in 
terms of familiar business concepts. However, the compatibility requirement states 
that just the opposite to be done –that is, the policy must be specified in terms that 
can be handled by the routers and servers in the network. Similarly, ease of use 
requires that much of the detail of the operation of the network elements be hidden 
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from the network operator. This is in direct contrast to the preciseness requirement 
[5].  
The reason for this apparent conflict is that there are at least two different levels of 
policies:  
 One that a human operator would like to enter and specify 
 One that the devices would actually be capable of enforcing 
Each of these levels imposes a different set of requirements on the policy definition 
and specification. The human operator uses a higher-level policy to express his/her 
objectives, which are then translated into a lower level of policies that are interpreted 
by each of the devices.  
Low level policies are specified to match a device‟s capabilities and include device 
specific commands. High level policies are more likely to human language sentences 
and depend on the end goal of the network operator. High level policies may be 
specified in a format that is intuitive to human operator A human operator must be 
able to specify the policies without significant effort. 
2.1.1.1 Rule 
A policy is defined as a combination of one or more sets of rules and rules are the 
components of policies that define specific criteria, or conditions, that when 
evaluated to TRUE, trigger certain actions.  
Each rule binds an action to sets of conditions that describe who (users), what 
(systems, applications), and in what circumstances the actions may be triggered. 
PBM rules can be broadly grouped into three categories: actions, conditions and 
roles. The details of each part are explained below. 
 Actions: Actions specify the behavior that managed devices must follow. 
Actions are typically associated with the handling of requests for services or 
capabilities provided by one or more hardware or software components 
within a network systems environment.  
 Conditions: Conditions allow manager to specify under what circumstances 
specific behavior is to be in effect. Conditions can be given as a single event, 
a logical combination of events or a case waiting for a certain value of a 
certain module in the system. 
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 Role: At the point of PBM, role is an administratively specified characteristic 
of a managed element (for example, an interface).  [3] 
2.1.2 Policy Management Tool 
The policy management tool mainly provides a console to interact with the human 
administrator and allows writing high-level policies; compiles the entered policies, 
checks the syntax and stores them in a repository. It needs to perform the following 
functions: 
 Present a user interface to the human administrator in order to enter the 
policies in a more user friendly level than the level that the managed devices 
can understand.  
 Validate the syntactic and semantic correctness of user input and any 
relationships that must exist between the different parameters.  
 Detect any conflicts between the high level policies.  
 Validate that the policies can be satisfied by given the network‟s resources 
and constraints. For example, a policy that asks that a traffic flow be 
encrypted using DES algorithm cannot be satisfied if the firewalls in the 
network do not support that algorithm. 
 Validate that the policies specified cover all the important scenarios that 
might be required for a specific application. This especially important for the 
policies related to security.  
 Determine which policies are applicable to which set of policy targets. 
 Determine which low-level policies can be used to support the high-level 
policies specified by the user and transform the high level policies in a format 
that they can be stored in policy repository. 
 Store the policies in the policy repository ant detect when the stored policies 
are modified. In the case of a modification, the management tool may choose 
to notify the relevant policy consumers of a change in the policies using a 
notification mechanism. 
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2.1.3 Policy Repository 
The policy repository is a data store where the policies are stored by the policy 
management tool and retrieved by policy decision points or policy enforcement 
points. The repository provides the central location that drives the operations of the 
entire network. 
An example of a policy repository is an LDAP directory that contains both the high-
level and low-level policies required for network operations. Instead of a directory, a 
database server or a Web server can be used. In a Web server, different files 
represent the policy information stored for the various devices and for each low-level 
device specific policy. 
Regardless of the type of repository selected, the policy stored in the repository 
needs to conform to specific conventions. These conventions are specified as the 
information model for policy specification.  
2.1.4 Policy Decision Point 
Policy Decision Point (also known as the Policy Server) retrieves the policies from 
policy repository and transforms them in format that the policy enforcement points 
can understand. Then PDP sends the lower level policies to the related PEPs. 
The PDP is responsible for the following functions: 
 Locating the set of rules that is applicable to any PEP it is managing, and 
retrieving the rules from the repository. 
 Transforming the set of rules it retrieves from the policy repository to a 
format and syntax that is understood by the PEP function. 
 Decide the PEP related to the policy that is to be sent to the managed device. 
 Checking the current state of the network and validating that the conditions 
required for the application of any policy are satisfied.  
 Keeping track of the changes in the policies that might take place by 
monitoring the repository or by listening to any notification from the 
management tool. 
 Detect any policy conflicts. 
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The entity implementing the policy would not be able to determine which action to 
perform. The implementers of policy systems must provide conflict detection and 
avoidance or resolution mechanisms to prevent this situation. "Policy conflict" is 
contrasted with policy error. Policy errors occur when attempts to enforce policy 
actions fail, whether due to temporary state or permanent mismatch between the 
policy actions and the device enforcement capabilities. 
2.1.5 Policy Enforcement Point 
The PEP represents the component that always runs on the policy aware node. It is 
the point at which policy decisions are actually enforced [6]. Policy enforcement 
point is the PBM system component which is responsible for the receiving of policies 
from PDP and enforcing these policies to the target managed device that the PEP 
supports. 
The basic interaction between the components begins with the PEP. The PEP will 
receive a notification or a message that requires a policy decision.  Given such an 
event, the PEP then formulates a request for a policy decision and sends it to the 
PDP.  The request for policy control from a PEP to the PDP may contain one or more 
policy elements (encapsulated into one or more policy objects) in addition to the 
admission control information (such as a flowspec or amount of bandwidth 
requested) in the original message or event that triggered the policy decision request.  
The PDP returns the policy decision and the PEP then enforces the policy decision 
by appropriately accepting or denying the request.  The PDP may also return 
additional information to the PEP which includes one or more policy elements. This 
information need not be associated with an admission control decision. Rather, it can 
be used to formulate an error message or outgoing/forwarded message [6]. This kind 
of execution is based on outsourcing model.  
Another approach is provisioning model. In provisioning model PEP do not send a 
policy request to PDP, PDP itself makes a policy decision and sends it directly to 
PEP needing no requests from PEP. The PEP also sends information to PDP (or 
management server according to the application) about the status of policy 
deployments and the configuration states of the devices supported by that PEP. The 
PEP also sends acknowledgments to PDP for any policy operation that is directed by 
PDP. This is practical for identifying errors that occur while trying to install the 
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policy, or for detecting failures that could have an effect on a previously installed 
policy decision. 
2.1.6 Communication Protocols 
In a PBM system communication is a subject between Policy Management 
Application, Policy Decision Point and Policy Enforcement Point. The protocols 
such as COPS, SNMP, Command Level Interface (CLI) [5], Telnet [7], XML [8], 
CORBA [9] and LDAP [10] are used for these communications. Some protocols are 
described below. 
SNMP is a framework (including a protocol) for managing systems in a network 
environment. It can be used for policy-based configuration and control using a 
specific MIB Module designed to execute policies on managed elements via scripts.  
The elements (instances) in a network device are evaluated using a policy filter, to 
determine where policy will be applied [3]. 
COPS is a simple query and response Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) based 
protocol that can be used to exchange policy information between a Policy Decision 
Point (PDP) and its clients (PEPs). The COPS protocol is used to provide for both 
the outsourcing and the provisioning of policy. Another usage is for the provisioning 
of policy [3]. 
COPS has been developed by the IETF Resource Allocation Protocol (RAP) WG as 
a policy protocol for use in PBM systems. COPS represents a revolutionary approach 
to the proactive management of network devices. It was developed as a reaction to 
traditional network management protocols, such as SNMP, which were found to be 
incapable of efficiently supporting Policy Based Networks. COPS is becoming the 
protocol of choice over SNMP, which offers reasonable device-monitoring 
capabilities. COPS may be used for the configuration of several different types of 
network services such as Diff-Serv Routing, Multi Protocol Label Switching 
(MPLS), Security, VPN, and VoIP.  
The IETF concentrates on the protocols to be used between different components 
with most of the efforts focusing on LDAP for storing policies, and the common 
open policy service (COPS) protocol for communication between a PDP and a PEP. 
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2.1.7 Repository and Policy Information Models 
There are integration problems among current management systems, especially in 
data specification. Common-problems encountered in data specification can reduce 
the reuse of management data. These problems are:  
 The same data can be named differently,  
 The same data may be realized using different data types or could be 
organized differently in each repository.  
If the data are named and/or organized differently in each management system, or 
stored in different data types, sophisticated mediation software will need to be used 
to enable exchange of the data between different management systems. 
Policy repository is a specific data store that holds policy rules, their conditions and 
actions, and related policy data such as logical container for reusable policy 
elements. A database or directory would be an example of such a store. Directories 
and LDAP are the industry choice for interoperable standard policy storage.  
An information model is “an abstraction and representation of the entities in a 
managed environment -their properties, operation, and relationships.” This is 
independent of any specific repository, application, protocol, or platform.  
Information models have been designed for use with policy protocols in PBM to 
exchange policy information among the PBM components. 
The Storage Networking Industry Association (SNIA) has announced the Common 
Information Model (CIM) Object Manager, designed to help create interoperable and 
well-managed storage systems and services. It provides an open source 
implementation of the Distributed Management Task Force's (DMTF) Web-Based 
Enterprise Management (WBEM) standard.  
Vendors can use the CIM Object Manager to define and manage standard objects, 
such as computer systems, storage media, and network ports, and their 
interrelationships, in an enterprise. The CIM Object Manager operates as a service 
layer, interfacing management agents and data providers to client applications. 
A multi-organizational effort involving the DMTF (Distributed Management Task 
Force), the IETF, and others, has been defining both an information model and the 
LDAP [10] schema including CIM, Directory Enabled Networks (DEN) and Policy 
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Core Information Model (PCIM), to represent standard policy information. 
Information model is an abstraction and representation of the entities in a managed 
environment, their properties and operations, and the way that they relate to each 
other. It is independent of any specific repository, application, protocol, or platform. 
2.1.7.1 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is a standard protocol and API used 
to access (read, write and query) Directory Services. The use of a directory as the 
central repository for a PBM system has several issues (performance, replication, and 
notifications) [10]. LDAP is the most common way vendors access stored user and 
resource data, and store policy information in these proprietary directories, though its 
application differs by vendor. LDAP directory can be used as a distribution and/or 
interoperability mechanism as well as a common directory format for sharing 
policies between multiple PBM systems.  
The PBM architecture assumes that multiple policy systems may need to interoperate 
within a single domain, and share the same policy information. A central repository 
can be used to store, distribute, and coordinate policy information among such 
systems.  
2.1.7.2 Common Information Model 
CIM [11,12] is an object-oriented information model which is developed by the 
DMTF for describing management data. An information model requires a set of legal 
statement types or syntax to capture the representation, and a collection of actual 
expressions necessary to manage common aspects of the computer systems. The 
CIM captures notions that are applicable to all areas of management, independent of 
what technology is implemented. The CIM schema maintained by the DMTF 
includes models for Systems, Applications, Local Area Networks (LAN) and 
Devices. The CIM schema enables applications from different developers on 
different platforms to describe management data in a standard format so that it can be 
shared among a variety of management applications. It consists of a specification 
detailing the abstract modeling constructs and principles of the Information Model, 
and a textual language definition to represent the Model. CIM's schemas are defined 
as a set of files, written in the language of the Specification. Sets of classes and 
associations represent CIM's Core and Common Models, defining an information 
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model for the "enterprise" - addressing general concepts, and systems, devices, users, 
software distribution, the physical environment, networks and policy. The xmlCIM 
Encoding Specification defines XML elements, written in Document Type Definition 
(DTD), which can be used to represent CIM classes and instances. The CIM 
Operations over Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) specification defines a 
mapping of CIM operations onto HTTP that allows implementations of CIM to 
interoperate in an open, standardized manner. 
2.1.7.3 Policy Core Information Model 
PCIM [11,12] is an information model describing the basic concepts of  policy 
groups, rules, conditions, actions, repositories and their relationships was proposed 
by IETF. This model is described as a "core" model since it cannot be applied 
without domain-specific extensions (for example, extensions for Quality of Service 
(QoS) or IPsec). PCIM is "core" with respect to the area of policy. 
COPS protocol requires a new data model called the Policy Information Base (PIB). 
The PIB is an information model proposed for use with the COPS protocol, to 
describe policies and the format of policy information exchanged between the PEP 
and PDP. 
2.1.7.4 Directory Enabled Networks 
The policies in the directory are typically at a level of abstraction that is distinctively 
business centric. In addition, this information is typically static relative to the policy 
rules in the PEPs, which need to be installed and changed in order to implement the 
business policies 
DEN [13] is an information model and schema produced by a consortium of vendors 
(such as Cisco, Microsoft) in order to promote the concept of application-aware 
networking through directory-based data integration. DEN allows defining a general 
directory schema that may include every kind of data on the network (such as users, 
devices, applications). DMTF develops the specifications of CIM related to the DEN. 
The work of the DEN group became the input for the IETF Policy WG and for a 
series of enhancements to the DMTF Common Information Model (CIM). 
The original goal of DEN was to define a set of network services that met the needs 
of policy based systems. DEN provides a set of abstractions that enable the services 
that applications need to be matched to the services provided by network. The 
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current network management approaches are not enabling to use business rules to 
develop management systems. On the other hand, the policy-based systems have not 
been fully realized yet. DEN is proposed to solve these two problems by translating 
business rules into device configuration. 
2.1.7.5 WEB Based Enterprise Management 
WBEM [14] is a set of management and Internet standard technologies that provides 
a unified management of enterprise computing environments across multiple vendor 
environments. WBEM simplifies system management, providing better access to 
both software and hardware data that is readable by WBEM compliant applications. 
WBEM has been designed to be compatible with all the major existing management 
protocols. The DMTF has developed a core set of standards that make up WBEM, 
which includes a data model, the Common Information Model (CIM) standard; an 
encoding specification, xmlCIM Encoding Specification; and a transport mechanism, 
CIM Operations over HTTP.  
WBEM implementations use a client – server model. The client applications generate 
requests against a Common Information Model Object Manager (CIMOM) using the 
WBEM client application programming interfaces (API). The CIMOM may interpret 
these requests using information in its internal store or support SNMP, CMIP and 
proprietary protocols through the use of Providers. These are Java translator classes 
responsible for acting as an interface between the CIMOM and the real managed 
object. The provider uses HTTP to interact with the CIMOM above and whatever 
protocol is appropriate to interact with the managed object below. Consequently, the 
provider classes are responsible for detecting and forwarding events to the 
management applications. WBEM Services are explained below: 
 CIM Object Manager (CIMOM): listens for WBEM client requests for CIM 
operations possible on CIM objects (ex. create/modify/delete class/instance, 
etc.). Requests on CIM class definitions are handled directly by the CIMOM. 
Requests on instances of a CIM class are dispatched to the Provider 
responsible for extracting the dynamic data for that CIM Class.  
 CIM Repository: is used by the CIMOM to store CIM class definition and 
dynamic data. 
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 Managed Object Format (MOF) Compiler: converts CIM class definitions in 
a text MOF file into CIM Repository formatted data.  
 MOF-to-JavaBeans Generator: generates JavaBeans based on the CIM class 
definitions in a text MOF file. 
 CIM Workshop: graphical application allows to browse the CIM schema and 
to perform operations on CIM Classes and Instances. 
A CIM object is a computer representation, or model, of a managed resource, such as 
a printer, disk drive, or CPU. CIM objects are imported into a CIMOM.  
The CIMOM provides a central repository for CIM objects on a WBEM-enabled 
system where WBEM clients in a network can go gather information about managed 
resources within the system. The CIMOM transfers information among WBEM 
clients, the CIMOM-Repository, and managed resources. When a WBEM client 
application requests information about a managed resource, the CIMOM contacts 
either the appropriate provider responsible for the CIM object that represents that 
managed resource or the CIMOM-Repository. When a WBEM client application 
requests data from a managed resource that is not available for the CIM Object 
Manager Repository, the CIM Object Manager forwards the request to the provider 
for that managed resource. CIMOM will use schema information to determine which 
providers to contact.  
Providers are special classes that communicate with managed objects to retrieve and 
then forward data to the CIMOM for integration and interpretation. Providers do the 
followings:  
 Register with the CIMOM - Providers register themselves with CIMOM by 
specifying a Provider Qualifier. Classes and properties marked by the 
provider qualifier will be an indication to the CIMOM that the associated 
information is dynamic and must be obtained from the providers rather than 
the repository. 
 Provide data to management applications – If the requested data is not 
available in the CIMOM-Repository, the CIMOM forwards the request to the 
provider responsible for that managed resources. On request generated by 
CIMOM, the provider accesses the data from the managed resource and 
passes the data back to the CIMOM. If the data received from a managed 
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resource is in a native format (such as C code), the provider maps the data to 
Java CIM classes prior to passing it to the CIMOM. Providers serve dynamic 
information to the CIMOM. 
 Control management resources - When a management application sends data 
to the CIMOM to control a managed resource, the CIMOM passes the data to 
the appropriate provider. If the managed resource requires data in a native 
format, the provider maps the CIM classes to the resource's native format 
prior to passing it along 
The requests originated by management applications may be for static information 
such as schema definitions or static instances that is stored in the CIMOM 
Repository. For the static data, the CIMOM should route the request to the 
repository.  
2.1.8 PBM Execution Models 
The PBM architectures can be classified as Outsourcing and Provisioning Policy 
Models according to the operation flows between entities. Another classification can 
be made according to the place of the enforcement logic and the classes are Active 
Policy and Active Agent Models. These classes can also be used in an integrated 
manner.  
In the case of an outsourcing policy model, the PDP receives policy requests from a 
network device (PEP), and determines whether or not to grant these requests. A PEP 
issues a query to delegate a decision for a specific policy event to another 
component, external to it. For example, a PEP requires a fast policy decision by 
sending a query to the PDP, asking for a policy decision to determines whether or not 
to grant permission to applications. Here, the PDP either accepts or rejects the 
request of applications based on the business-level policy found in the repository. 
This model is sometimes referred to as "Pull" mode, or "reactive" mode, since the 
PEP pulls policy decisions from the PDP, while the PDP responds according to the 
PEP events. 
In the policy-provisioning model where network elements are pre-configured based 
on policy, prior to processing events, the PDP predicts future configuration needs, 
and proactively provisions resources accordingly or some new policies entered at the 
management console might be distributed in real-time. In other words, rather than 
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responding to PEP events, the PDP prepares and "pushes" configuration information 
to the PEPs. 
"Outsourced Policy" is contrasted with "Provisioned Policy", but they are not 
mutually exclusive and operational systems may combine the two. Both models 
employ policy servers as the PDP to control the network devices that enforce the 
policy (i.e. PEPs).   
In Active Policy Model [15,16], the policy rules are written in a protocol 
independent, platform independent language, the policy rule can execute in a PEP as 
an active policy, when the policy is deployed. The management functionality is 
delegated to autonomous agents such as active network capsules [17] and Mobile 
Agents [18] operating on behalf of the PDP and PEP. Active PBM uses this 
approach. 
Active Manager (Passive Policy) concept uses policies as passive objects; these 
policies do not instigate management operations. Managers which are generally 
stationary software agents are the active objects which are responsible for 
interpreting a policy and performing the activities specified. Most of the work adopt 
this approach such as Ponder [19].  
Script MIB PBM system presents both Active Policy and Active Management 
concepts. 
2.1.9 PBM Target Domains 
Generally, PBM can be used almost for any domain, including Security and QoS 
management domains. In addition, policy has also been proposed for Routing 
management. While policy can describe constraints on all these service domains, the 
operational constraints on these domains differ and these differences can influence 
the tradeoffs made in implementing a policy-based management system.  
The security domain (filtering and cryptography) is the least forgiving of error. If 
there is a hiccup in the enforcement of a security policy, the connectivity may be 
permanently loosen or the trust may be loosen by allowing intruders access. The 
policy applications in these domains generally include Access Control, Role Based 
Access Control applications. 
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Routing policy has the biggest scaling problem. Huge numbers of routers must be 
coordinated to consistently enforce the policy goals. For this reason, routing policy 
tends to be more dynamic and tolerant of changes in the routes. Routing domain 
policy applications are usually concerned with the routers, routing protocols and 
policy servers controlling them.  
QoS policies provide abstractions to simplify the management of QoS mechanisms. 
They contain rules that govern how resources can be used, or how applications and 
users should be treated. Policies form a bridge between Service Level Agreements 
(SLAs) and the network elements that deliver the desired performance and services. 
SLAs between customers and their service providers define what QoS should be and 
how much it will cost the customers to get it. 
QoS policy enforcement falls somewhere, between the security domain and the 
routing domain. An edge-oriented QoS administrative model will be on the same 
scale as firewall enforcement. A more detailed administrative model will impact 
more enforcing devices and have more of a scaling concern. 
The rise of PBM has resulted from the growing need for automated QoS 
management. Organizations are managing their existing bandwidth using a QoS-
focused PBM product. The fit between QoS and PBM is natural. QoS introduces 
unfairness, some applications get preferential treatment at the expense of others. 
Policy rules are an excellent vehicle to express and control this desired unfairness. 
Recent work in the IETF has led to the development of standards for a QoS-enabled 
Internet. Through the efforts of the Integrated Services working group, data flows 
can describe their desired or required service to the network. Resource ReSerVation 
Protocol (RSVP) carries the service requests into the network, where the acceptance 
of these QoS requests results in better network service to some flows, possibly at the 
expense of service to traditional best-effort flows. 
Integrated Services (IntServ) is a standard framework designed to address the need 
for better than best effort service in an IP network in which voice, video, and data 
have been integrated. IntServ provides the ability for applications to choose among 
multiple, controlled levels of delivery service for their data packets. It requires that 
network elements support the establishment of these service levels, and that 
applications have a mechanism to signal their requirements (e.g. RSVP). 
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Differentiated Services (Diff-Serv) is a framework for providing differentiated 
classes of service for Internet traffic. A bit-pattern (known as a code-point) marks an 
IP packet to receive a particular treatment, or per-hop behavior, at each network 
node. The IP header field, called the DS-field in IPv4, defines the layout of the ToS 
(Type of Service) octet; in IPv6 it is the Traffic Class octet. Differentiated Services 
requires policy to define the correspondence between code points in the packet's DS-
field and individual per-hop behaviors. Routers do not need to maintain state for each 
flow. Instead, they provide the differential service based solely on the edge packet 
marking. 
Resource ReSerVation setup Protocol (RSVP) is a QoS signaling protocol developed 
by the IETF RSVP Working Group to establish a reserved "pipe" of Integrated 
Services (Int-Serv) reservations end-to-end.  RSVP is a standard, signaling protocol 
for applications to request and reserve bandwidth across a routed network. The IETF 
has begun work on using RSVP to combine the benefits of IntServ and DiffServ. 
Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) [20] is new IP-forwarding paradigm using 
labels attached to packets, enabling classification, traffic engineering (explicit 
routes), and increased scalability/performance. Like DiffServ, MPLS is growing in 
stature within the IETF and the industry. 
Role-based Access Control Management Framework for management of distributed 
systems [21] is another target domain. In this framework, organizational structure is 
often specified in terms of organizational positions such as regional, site or 
departmental network manager, service administrator, service operator. Specifying 
organizational policies for people in terms of role-positions rather than persons, 
permits the assignment of a new person to the position without re-specifying the 
policies referring to the duties and authorizations of that position. The tasks and 
responsibilities corresponding to the position are grouped into a role associated with 
the position which is essentially a static concept in the organization. A role is thus 
the position, the set of authorization policies defining the rights for that position and 
the set of obligation policies defining the duties of that position. 
2.2 A Historical Perspective 
Policy work in the industry has been occurring in various consortia and standards 
bodies through the years. The first use of the term “policy” in the context of IP 
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networks was for specifying routing policies in the internet. The internet is composed 
of many subnetworks, each independently administrated by various Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) and interconnected via various exchange points. A scheme for 
describing what types of packets each ISP would accept forwarding was needed at 
the exchange points. This led to the specification of routing policies and a language 
for specifying routing policies. 
The next step in the area of policies was done in the context of resource reservation 
policies. This work began within the IETF in 1996 and led to the development of a 
protocol called “Common Open Policy Service (COPS)”. Soon, the developer 
realized that this could be used for more functions than the original objective. Since 
late 1998, there has been a lot of activity to insulate COPS from its close ties to 
resource reservations, and to use it as a general purpose policy protocol.  
The biggest boost to policy activity was obtained through the “Directory Enabled 
Networks (DEN)” Initiative in 1998, led by Microsoft and Cisco corporations. With 
the dominant position of Microsoft in the workstation operating system market and 
that of Cisco in the internet router space, this initiative aroused a lot of interest within 
the industry. The goal of DEN is to build a networking infrastructure that is easier to 
operate and manage than the traditional ones. The ease of management was obtained 
by driving the networks from a central repository originally based on a directory. 
The basic approach of DEN was to store different types of information related to 
different network devices and applications in a directory and to use that to manage 
the network. The major thrust of DEN is to define a standard format (or a schema) by 
which the properties relating to network devices are defined. In other words, the 
information stored in the directories had to correspond to a specific model that DEN 
specified [22]. 
In order to get a more open standard, the companies involved in DEN decided to 
migrate the work to the DMTF by the end of 1998. DMTF is an industry consortium 
formed in 1992 by several computer companies with the goal of developing a 
common method for managing personal computers. DMTF defines a common 
information mode that originally intended to be used to describe the characteristics of 
a computer. It was extended to apply to networks of computers and other devices. 
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These specifications form the Common Information Model (CIM) for systems and 
network management.  
At the same time that the DMTF activity started, an activity within the IETF was 
started with the goal of defining a framework that could be used to specify policies 
across various disciplines, and to show that it could be used in the context of QoS 
disciplines [5].  
2.3 Implemented Products 
2.3.1 Academic Products 
Ponder framework [23] is one of the academic tools consisting of a policy 
specification language, an architecture for deploying policies based on the language 
and a set of tools for specifying and managing policies. In conjunction with the 
language, the toolkit permits integrated administration of resources, people and 
policy information with automated policy deployment. The toolkit comprises an 
Integrated Development Environment (IDE) with a policy compiler, as well as tools 
for managing policies and roles at runtime. It includes a domain browser provides a 
common user interface to select policies and enforcement components from the 
directory, as well as with the policy compiler to interactively instantiate policies. The 
implementation includes a policy administration toolkit that supports the 
specification and management of policies. Policies and roles are created using a 
policy editor, compiled and stored in the domain service 
Developed in the snmpconf working group of the IETF, [24] includes a tool based on 
Script MIB and combines the IETF specifications for policy based configuration 
management and infrastructure for distributed management by delegation. The IETF 
Script MIB allows sending management scripts containing either policy objects 
(IETF format) or policy codes (java classes) to the distributed Script MIB agents 
acting as PDP, which includes a runtime engine designed to evaluate policies. The 
policy runtime engine contains implementations of all application specific libraries 
such as PCIM policy classes that are to be evaluated, and it has access to the network 
elements to be configured by these policies. This tool provides capabilities to transfer 
management scripts to distributed managers, initiate, monitor, and terminate the 
execution of management scripts. The evaluation of rules is always initiated by 
Events. In the future, they plan to replace their language with a policy specification 
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language such as Ponder. The authors have implemented a limited conditions 
evaluation mechanism supporting only time-related triggering services. Also, they 
haven‟t taken into consideration of conflict detection and resolution yet. 
[25] describes a management architecture based on the IETF framework for the 
policies specified for QoS. In this system, the similar modules as our Police model 
such as Event Service as Event Manager and PolicyGauge as Sensor are employed.  
They use Ponder language as high-level policy language with refinement into expert 
system rules. Sensors are classes which are used to collect, maintain, and process a 
wide variety of attribute information within the instrumented processes. Each sensor 
is associated with an attribute (Figure 2.2). The sensor‟s methods (probes) are used 
to initialize sensors with threshold and target values and collect values of attributes. 
Probes are embedded into process code to facilitate interactions with sensors. When 
an applications starts up, it instantiates its “coordinator”. The coordinator then 
registers with the “Name Server”. The Name Server receives and maintains 
registration data collected from other components and application processes in a 
repository. The Name Server coordinates the interaction between the QoS 
management components and the application‟s coordinator. 
After the application has registered with the Name Server, it requests its QoS 
requirements from the Policy Manager. The Policy Manager is the only type of PDP 
to receive events directly. Corresponding event identifiers are sent to PDP and trigger 
the execution of rules. The PDP then registers its interest in the event identified by 
the event identifier with the Event Manager. The PEP has two components. The first 
component, implemented in Java, interacts with PDPs. The second component has 
specific “resource managers” such as the CPU manager and the Memory Manager. 
These resource managers actually manipulate the resources and are specific for 
applications. There is a resource manager for each resource. The policies were put 
into XML and references to the XML file were placed in the LDAP directory. Ponder 
policies are expressed with XML language. 
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Figure 2.2 Management architecture 
 
[26] describes an architecture and algorithms for on-line discovery of quantitative 
models without prior knowledge of the managed elements. It is interesting because of 
its usage of CIM Object Manager (CIMOM) [27] concept and on-line discovery of 
the managed node‟s element schema specified with CIM that describes the 
capabilities of the resources of nodes(e.g., a database has tables and tablespaces), 
especially associated metrics (e.g., rows read, sort times) and configuration 
parameters. Each managed node has a CIM agent which is responsible for 
maintaining current values of the resources in the managed node as well as 
responding to requests to query the element schema of the managed node. The CIM 
agent actually is a CIM Object Manager based on the Web based Enterprise 
Management (WBEM) [27] framework. Responsible for handling incoming requests 
 27 
and dispatching them to providers, this agent is an SNIA (Storage Networking 
Industry Association) CIM Object Manager [28]. There is a manager that 
communicates with the agents of managed nodes to collect data from managed nodes 
and passes to its clients, management applications. The data requested from Agent 
are retrieved by the CIMOM, either from its instance repository or directly from the 
CIM providers. 
Verma [29] describes a QoS tool used to specify Service Level Agreements (SLAs) 
and to manipulate SLA related information in a tabular format. The tool transforms 
high-level policy information into device configurations, and stores them in an 
LDAP directory.  
2.3.2 Commercial PBM Products 
Most of the tools come from industry and is based on the IETF policy framework. 
The majority of the commercial tools are specific to QoS management, but many 
also include access control management. Beyond a few basic "must-have" 
components, PBM solutions tend to vary from one vendor to the next. A common 
feature in commercial tools is a graphical user interface which typically allows the 
administrator to visually select a network device or other managed element from a 
hierarchically arranged tree-view of policy targets, and specify the policies in the 
form of if <condition> then <action> rules for the selected targets. The different 
products allow the specification of varying degrees of conditions in policy rules 
including a number of time attributes, source or destination IP addresses, IP type 
service, TCP and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) port numbers, as well as higher 
level user-defined data, and allow the user to permit or deny traffic based on those 
conditions. 
The different standards protocols are implemented at varying degrees from the 
different vendors. A lot of the products support COPS as the main communication 
protocol for policy information between the components of their architecture, while 
others support HTTP or CLI for the configuration of routers and switches. In 
addition, not all vendors support LDAP for storing policies although they use 
directories as a major component of their products both for storing policy rules as 
well as network and user information, in order to enable scalability and third-party 
interoperability. Support for security is also available in many of the commercial 
 28 
products, and includes access control configuration for firewalls and routers, Unix 
and Windows operating systems, as well as databases or for web-access. Some 
products such as Tivoli‟s and Computer Associates are focusing on enterprise-level 
management of security for e-commerce applications and support role-based 
management of user access rights. 
Vendors are reinventing network management, transforming its role from passive 
network monitoring to active QoS and network SLA provisioning. Policy 
management is necessary to administer network QoS, Security and Resources 
throughout the enterprise. More than 15 vendors are preparing PBM solutions that 
promise to enhance QoS and enterprise end to end security [30,31].  
The major commercial PBM products  are Nortel Optivity policy services, 
Orchestream, HP Openview PolicyXpert, Cisco CiscoAssure policy networking, 
Cisco Policy Manager, Allot communications NetPolicy, IPHighway open policy 
system, Lucent technologies RealNet rules, SolSoft Visual Policy Management for 
Network Security, Novell ZENworks, Computer Associates Infrastructure 
Management and eTrust solutions and Tivoli Management Framework product suite. 
Device configuration can be accomplished only by employing a combination of CLI 
(command-level interface), SNMP, COPS and LDAP. But, most vendors plan to 
implement COPS and LDAP in their products, appropriate to the IETF standards.  
There are other roles for PBM, too: For example, while most vendors consider policy 
management a means to manage device configuration, there are others, such as HP, 
that see PBM as an end-to-end tool for COPS-enabled desktops as well as network 
hardware. By pushing policy to the desktop, the network administrator can control 
applications and set up differentiated services at their source.  
In short time, Directory-enabled networks (DEN) will be used to reconcile the user 
and resource information in directory server with the PBM. Most vendors see a DEN 
PBM solution in their futures, but how the vendors will use the directory differs 
greatly. Extreme Networks sees the directory as a way for policy servers to share 
information, allowing scalability and third-party interoperability. For Allot, using a 
directory enables its customers to insert new policies without having to develop a 
special API. Lucent sees the directory as a giant storehouse of information, where 
each user has a private subtree. For Lucent, the directory is the single sign-on for 
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complete network resource management, both voice and data services. The vendor 
plans to accomplish this via a directory-independent LDAP schema. Lucent is the 
only vendor to implement an LDAP client on their switches. Lucent has plans to 
integrate a COPS agent and a proxy translator for CLI and SNMP management in a 
future release of RealNet Rules.  
Long term, Cisco plans to build a feedback system so powerful that the network will 
be able to reprovision itself based on changing network conditions. Future products 
will use directories as an interface to outside-world data. Allot's NetPolicy was the 
only solution that featured an active feedback mechanism, which lets the policy 
administrator view, in real time, the effects of deploying a particular policy on the 
network. Because all network traffic passes through the Allot hardware, 
administrators can track flows and the policy's effects on those flows. It allows QoS 
policies.  
HP's OpenView PolicyXpert told in 4.4 [32] is based on COPS and RSVP protocol, 
which was poorly supported by the rest of the vendors. The policy conditions used in 
PolicyXpert's can be complex combinations of one or more of the following 
parameters: time, date, day of week, application type (TCP or UDP port number), 
source or destination IP addresses or ranges, IP type of service, HTTP Uniform 
Resource Locator (URL) or Virtual Local area Network (VLAN) ID. In addition, 
PolicyXpert allows permit or deny traffic based on the RSVP admission control 
model.  Its biggest strengths are its multivendor nature, its RSVP capabilities, which 
are rivaled only by IPHighway's solution told in 4.5, and its use of COPS to 
provision all devices on the network. When COPS is not available on a target 
platform, a proxy agent acts on behalf of the Xpert software to configure the non-
COPS-compliant device. PolicyXpert has no filtering or security support, nor is there 
any LDAP integration. PolicyXpert's is planned to be integrated with the HP 
OpenView architecture. HP could offer a solution capable of assessing and 
monitoring service-level guarantees in addition to provisioning policy. PolicyXpert 
supports only a single policy and deploying it to heterogeneous devices throughout 
the network, across elements from multiple vendors. Any managed object supporting 
one or more of the QoS methods can be integrated with PolicyXpert. 
The Spectrum Management PBM Suite offers the largest range of conditions of any 
product, including ethertype (protocol), source or destination physical port, IP ToS 
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information, IP protocol type, Internet Packet Exchange Protocol (IPX) Class of 
Service, IPX packet type, IP source and destination addresses or address ranges, IPX 
network numbers and addresses, IP UDP or TCP port number, and IPX socket 
number. Spectrum has ground-up directory architecture. The suite implements the 
latest CIM draft specifications in which to store its policies. LDAP extensions allow 
the directory to notify the policy manager of changes to the directory. 
 31 
3 POLICE 
POLICE Policy Based Management System is the Ph. D. Thesis of Taner Dursun and 
is the result of the Taner Dursun‟s participation in work at TÜBİTAK UEKAE on 
distributed systems management over the last 5 years. Many of the ideas developed 
in this thesis are the result of group discussions with Professor Bülent Örencik and 
our colleagues working in UEKAE. 
POLICE develops and presents a complete policy based management framework, 
which includes a policy specification language and a policy deployment architecture. 
The several aspects of the framework are already presented in [33-36]. 
In this section, POLICE PBM System architecture, POLICE policy definition 
language, system‟s main components and Conflict Detection mechanism are 
described.   
3.1 POLICE Policy Definition Language 
To facilitate policy management activities it is necessary to use a policy language 
easily understandable by human administrators in conjunction with an integrated 
toolkit for the deployment, enforcement and coordination of policies within the 
system. The versatility of policy for use in system management depends a lot on the 
descriptive power of the policy language. This section describes the policy 
specification language employed in the Police PBM framework that can be used for 
specifying general-purpose management policies. Unlike many other policy 
specification notations, providing uniform enforcement for all kind of policies makes 
the Police simpler. Another novelty provided by Police is integrating condition and 
event concepts used separately in Literature. The semantics of the language provide 
an unambiguous description for the execution of the various elements of the policy 
specification and can enable further work in policy analysis. 
According to Police philosophy, an effective management of a system can be 
performed by getting activities of the active entities (actor) under control by: 
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 Arranging access permissions in the system. This can be achieved by defining 
all permitted actions for each actor (Permission-based regime). An alternative 
of this approach might be defining both permitted and forbidden actions per 
actor or per passive objects (targets, which are affected by the activities of the 
actors.) basis. But this could increase the complexity of the enforcement 
process that run counter to our goals. 
 Arranging the activities of the actors as responses to changing conditions in 
the system (events, objects properties, etc.).  This can be achieved by defining 
actions must be performed by specific actors in case of condition changes.  
Police is declarative, and borrows features from the object-oriented world. The 
language is flexible, expressive to cover the wide range of requirements implied by 
the current distributed systems paradigms. In this thesis, however, we adopted some 
of them but didn‟t consider several of them as explained in the following list: 
 Authorization and obligation policies are involved. Any request made by an 
actor which is an active object can be defined in terms of an action on an 
object, so authorization policies define the relationship between actors and 
actions on target objects. 
 Only positive policies are adopted to eliminate some kind of policy conflict 
as explained in the Section 3.3.2. 
 In order to support for monitoring, logging and auditing of events in the 
managed system, the event constraints are employed not only in obligation 
policies but also in authorization policies. 
 The management actions that need to be performed periodically, or when 
triggered by events are defined. This is achieved through event constraints in 
the obligation policies. 
 Policies are independent of the implementation of the managed system such 
as access control mechanisms, operating systems, object-middleware, 
databases and programming languages. 
 Delegation policies specification not adopted to cater for temporary transfer 
of access rights. 
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 Constraints are employed in order to restrict the validity of the policies that 
can be specified in the system under certain conditions based on the state of 
the system, or the state of the policy targets. 
 It is possible to specify policies relating to large systems by employing 
domain concept to groups of objects. 
 Policy reuse and parameterization of policy specifications are adopted. 
 The self-management by treating policies as objects in order to enable the 
specification of policies whose targets are other policies is not yet considered.  
 But its object-oriented feature of the language may provide extensibility and 
scalability automatically.  
 Policies are represented flexibly. 
 Policies are represented in an unambiguous way. 
 Police model support multiple devices and vendors because of the separation 
between the language and the underlying implementation of the managed 
system. 
 Language is also abstract not to need updates to software on the managed 
system except the node management interface. 
 Language does not support negative policies. However it does not include 
support to avoid the application specific conflicts. Instead, these types of 
conflicts are handled by the deployment model employing a distributed 
mechanism. 
3.1.1 Language Syntax 
All policies are related to objects with interfaces defined in terms of methods by 
using an interface definition language so that the policies establish a relationship 
between the actors that perform the operations and the target objects on which the 
operations are performed. The term actor refers to users, principals or automated 
manager components, or any entity initiating operations within the system, which 
have management responsibility (human or automated manager components). The 
actors access target objects (resources or service), by invoking the methods are 
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defined on the interface of the target objects. Managers that are actors for a set of 
policies may in turn, be target objects for a set of policies. 
The notation is essentially aimed at specifying policies which are interpreted by 
automated agents, but can also be used to specify high-level abstract policies or goals 
that could be interpreted by humans. The policies are interpreted rather than 
compiled into the code of agents, so can be changed dynamically. Although Police 
language does not need syntactic analysis because of the elimination of modality 
conflicts, it still has a clear syntax that the policies can be analyzed for any purpose. 
Everything in bold is a language keyword in the figures presenting the syntax, 
including symbols. Choices are enclosed in round brackets ( ) separated by |, optional 
elements are specified with square brackets [ ] and repetition is specified with braces 
{ }. The complete syntax of the language is written in SableCC [37] source file 
format (based on BNF). SableCC can be used to specify LALR(1) grammars which 
are a subset of LR(1) grammars and thus a subset of the context-free grammars that 
can be specified using BNF. 
Table 3.1 Police policy syntax 
//Authorisation policy 
inst cando policyName { 
 [actor domainScopeExpression;] 
 target domainScopeExpression; 
 action action-list; 
 when constraintExpression; 
} 
 
//Obligation policy 
inst mustdo policyName { 
[actor   domainScopeExpression;] 
target domainScopeExpression; 
action obligationActionList; 
when constraintExpression; 
} 
 
//constraint expression 
( (always|never)| 
  (timeExpression|conditionExpression|eventExpression)* ) 
 
 
The syntax of a Police policy is shown in Table 3.1. The actor of a policy, defined in 
terms of a domain scope expression, specifies the human or automated managers and 
agents to which the policies apply. The target of a policy, also defined in terms of a 
domain scope expression, specifies the objects on which actions are to be performed. 
The actions specify what must be performed for obligations and what is permitted for 
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authorizations. It consists of method invocations and may list different methods for 
different object types. Multiple actions in an authorization policy indicate the set of 
actions or operations which are permitted. Multiple actions in an obligation policy 
imply that they are performed sequentially after the policy is triggered. The 
constraint, defined by the when clause, limits the applicability of a policy, e.g. to a 
particular time period, or making it valid after a particular date (e.g. when time 
>1/June/1999). In addition, the constraint could be based on attribute values of any 
managed object in the managed system. Constraints are evaluated automatically and 
continuously by Event Services as explained in the Section 5.4. Whereas in Ponder, 
the constraints are evaluated every time an obligation policy is triggered or 
authorization policy is checked to see whether the policy still applies as attribute 
values may change. In the managed system, there may be actions executed 
automatically by hidden actors such as the system‟s itself (Impersonal Policy). 
Hence, the actor fields are optional. The action part can be extended to include any 
kind of statements composed of method calls on local or remote target objects. It 
specifies what must be performed for obligations and what is permitted for 
authorizations. Constraints sections can be specified to limit the applicability of both 
authorization and obligation policies based on time, values of the attributes of the 
objects, or events. 
3.1.2 Policy Instantiation 
In addition to direct declaration of policy instances using the syntax shown in Table 
3.2, the Police language supports reuse of the policy types by instantiating them with 
different parameters in order to create new policies. Multiple instances can then be 
created and tailored for the specific environment by passing actual parameters. Table 
3.2 shows the syntax for policy types and direct declaration of policy instances using 
the keyword “inst”. Multiple instances can then be created and tailored for the 
specific environment by passing actual parameters. 
Table 3.2 The syntax for policy templates and instantiations 
//type syntax 
type ( cando | mustdo ) policyTypeName ( formalParameters ) { 
    [actor  domainScopeExpression;] 
    [target domianScopeExpression;] 
    action actionList ; 
    when constraintExpression ;  
} 
//instance created 
inst (cando|mustdo)policyName=policyTypeName (actualParameters); 
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3.1.3 Policy Types 
There are two types of Police policies: authorization policies which specify what 
activities an actor is permitted to perform on a set of target objects and obligation 
policies which specify what activities an actor must do to a set of target objects. In 
the Literature, these two classes can be further divided into positive and negative 
policies [38,39]. Administrators often express high-level access control in terms of 
both positive and negative policies; retaining the natural way people express policies 
is important and provides greater flexibility. Negative authorization policies, for 
example, can be used to temporarily remove access rights from actors if the need 
arises. Although there are reasons to support negative policies and many researchers 
such as [40] have acknowledged their usefulness, they complicate enforcement 
process by causing several difficulties such as modality policy conflicts. Although 
this adds the need to analyze policies for conflict detection, this kind of conflict may 
indicate potentially unforeseen problems with the specification. Instead of negative 
policies, Police uses constraint keywords like “never” and, “always” to restrict some 
actions. Actually Police philosophy is based-on “Permission-Based Regime” in 
which prohibition is the default unless explicitly permitted. The keywords specified 
above can be used only to narrow scope of policies in terms of actors. Thus, a 
manager can make an enforcement of a policy differentiate for an individual (actor) 
than actual actors set.  
3.1.3.1 Authorization policies  
Authorization (cando) policies are designed to give permissions to actors to perform 
a set of activities (method calls) on a set of target objects. They are essentially access 
control policies to protect resources from unauthorized access but are conceptually 
enforced near the actors instead of target objects to be effected by the operations 
actor performed. This point differentiates Police from Ponder language. The 
following example gives a view of the language:  
 
 
type cando Login (actor A, target T, validaTI, int maxLogOff) { 
  action T.login(); 
  when Times.within(validTI) and A.logoffCount <= maxLogOff;  
} 
 
inst cando loginPolicy1 = Login(/student/c401,LabServer/server1, 
0900-1700,10);  
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/* all students from c401 are permitted to login to server named 
server1, but only between 09:00 and 17:00 and maksimum 10 times a 
day.*/ 
 
Elements of a policy can be specified in any order. The name of a policy can be 
specified as a path, thus identifying the directory path into which the policy will be 
stored. 
3.1.3.2 Obligation policies 
Obligation (mustdo) Policies define what actions an actor must do if the conditions 
specified in the policy are met or certain events occur. The obligation policies do not 
depend on authorization policies.  This means that if the conditions for an obligation 
policy are met, the action will be performed immediately without checking if there is 
any authorization policy allowing the actor to run this action 
Some actions specified in an obligation policy may be related to the real-world 
entities like human users, another device, etc. We called such objects as 
Asynchronous Entities (AE) because of indeterministic nature of their behaviors. So, 
policies about them are actually applied to the software agents representing them in 
the system. Thus, all obligation policies for a synchronous actor are enforced 
directly, for an AE indirectly through its representing agent, MOR (Managed Object 
Representative). MOR‟s can act as proxies for the user to allow access to resources 
permitted by the obligation policies or they can act as automated agents, executing 
obligation policies on the AEs‟ behalf. 
In the following policies, the users must change their passwords when expired and 
the account failing to login tree times must be disabled. 
 
// disable a user account if the user fails 3 times to login 
inst mustdo LoginFailure { 
 actor s= /Student/Admin; 
 target t= /Student/users; 
 action t.disable(),s.log(t);  
 when 3*loginfail(t); 
} 
 
// a password older than one mount is changed 
type mustdo PasswordExpiration (actor A){ 
  target t = A; 
  when t.ageOfPwd >= Time.day(30); 
  action t.changePwd();   
} 
 
 
 38 
The actor element is optional as obligation actions may be internal to the system, 
whereas authorization actions always relate to an actor. The action can be prefixed 
with the name of the object on which the action is called. If no prefix is specified, the 
action is assumed to be on the target interface by default. An action within an 
obligation policy may result in an operation on a remote target object. This could fail 
due to remote system or network failure so an “exception mechanism” should be 
provided for obligations to permit the specification of alternative actions to cater for 
failures which may arise in any distributed system. In Police system there is no such 
a support yet, whereas Ponder has. 
3.1.4 Constraint Expressions 
An important element of each policy is the set of conditions under which the policy 
is valid. This information must be explicit in the specification of the policy. A subset 
of the Object Constraint Language (OCL) [41] is used to specify constraints in 
Ponder. OCL is simple to understand and use, and it is declarative – each OCL 
expression is conceptually atomic and so the state of the objects in the system cannot 
change during evaluation. The constraints limit the applicability of a policy and are 
expressed in terms of a predicate, which must evaluate to true for the policy to apply. 
Policy constraints can be considered as conjunctions of basic constraints, which can 
be either time or state based. The analysis of a set of policies can then be 
substantially improved since time-based constraints can be compared for possible 
overlap and state based constraints can be either simultaneously satisfied or mutually 
exclusive if they relate to states of the same system component. Limiting the 
applicability of a policy, constraint expressions can be based on a particular time 
period, attribute values of objects, or events: 
 Actor/target state constraints based on the object state as reflected in terms of 
attributes at the object interface. 
 Action/event parameters constraints based on event parameter values in 
obligations or action parameter values in authorizations or refrains.  
 Time constraints which specify the validity periods for the policy. A time 
library object provided with the Ponder language is used to specify time 
constraints. 
 Events: simple or complex event expressions. 
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In contrast to the many other policy languages [42,43], all policies specified in Police 
can be event-triggered. Events can be real, i.e. internal system events, or pseudo 
events notified by Event Service components.  
In Ponder, however, the events cannot be used in the constraint expressions. Instead, 
only in obligation policies there is separate element to specify on which event the 
policy will be triggered. Police provide event constraint for the authorization policies 
as well by putting event expression into common constraint expression syntax for 
each type of policies. 
3.1.5 Event Definitions 
Event-condition-action rules prove to be a very flexible approach to specifying 
management policy as exemplified by Policy Definition Language (PDL) [44], a 
language implemented and used in Lucent switching products. In the PDL schema, 
each set of event instances occurring “simultaneously” in an event stream is called an 
epoch which is an application specific time window. Primitive events can be 
composed to form composite events that enable policies to be enforced under any of 
the following situations. In order to express system events, complicated event 
expressions are adopted from the PDL, defining several operators to derive 
composite events from primitive events. Events in Police are used as a Constraint 
section element to limit the applicability of the policies. Events can be simple, i.e. an 
internal system event, or a pseudo event notified by changes in the properties of 
managed objects. Composite events can be specified using event composition 
operators. Table 3.3 specifies how the event composition operators of the PDL are 
used in Police. All event operators have equal precedence and evaluation is strictly 
left to right. 
It is possible to define events separately, and reuse them in multiple policies. The 
definition of an event may be parameterized. Event parameters map onto the event 
attributes, which define new names within the scope of the policy object where the 
event is specified. These names can then be referenced within the policy: 
event timerA = Timer.at("2001:12:15", "22:17:00"); 
event databaseFailure(db,try)=(connectionLost(db)-> failedSql(try)); 
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The first parameter corresponds to the parameter of the connectionLost(db) while the 
second to the parameter of failedSql(try). The two events that are used in the event 
expression are assigned to the new event. 
Table 3.3 PDL Events and usage in Police 
PDL statement Meaning 
e1| e2|…| en 
occurance of one of events ei in an epoch 
Police :  e1| e2 ( occurs if either e1 or e2) 
e1 & e2 &... & en   
Simultaneous occurance of n events in an epoch 
Police : e1 && e2 ( occurs if both e1 and e2 occur) 
!e 
No occurrence of event in an epoch 
Police : !{ e1 e2 + time-period} ( no occurance of 
e1 during the time-period after the occurance of  e2   
e1, e2 
event e2 immediately follows an event e1 
Police :  e1  e2 ( occurs if e1 occurs before e2) 
^e 
a sequence of zero or more occurrences of an event 
Police : ^e : (at least once occurance of e) 
group (e1 & e2 &... & en ) 
or                                 
group (e1| e2|…| en  ) 
a single event grouping all instances of the complex 
event. If there are n instances of e1 and m instances of 
event e2 in an epoch, there is only one occurrence of 
group (e1 & e2) instead of m xn occurrences 
Police: not adopted 
Aggregation functions to evaluate values over multiple epochs.  
Count (e) 
Number of occurrences of event e. For example, in a 
sequence of epochs  { e1 , e3 , e1}, { e2 , e3 }, { e4 }, { 
e2,  e1 }, { e2 } Count( e1, ^( e2 & e3) ) is equals one 
and Count(e1, ^( e2 | e3 ) ) is 3. 
Police : n*e : means the event e occures n times 
consequently, instead of using “Count(e)>n”.  
(Occurs if e occurs n times). 
Other aggregations 
Sum, Avg, Max, Min, etc.) relating to event 
parameters to aggregate values over multiple epochs 
Police: not adopted 
 
In addition to ordinary system events, the pseudo-events in the constraint section of a 
policy are created to observe attributes of the managed system‟s objects and occur 
when these attributes reach at specified value ranges. The sophisticated time period 
conditions can also be implemented as pseudo-events. For example, the statements 
like “object1.attribute2 > 200”, “Date > 10.12.2003” are considered as pseudo-
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events. Together with the system events, the pseudo-events compose complex event 
statements in the constraint section of the policies. To connect the pseudo events 
with system events, the same operators as specified in Table 3.3 are used. 
3.1.6 Constant Definitions 
Constants can be defined in Police. A type identifier can be used to indicate the user-
defined type of a constant if it is not one of the predefined types (int, real, string, 
boolean). “User-defined” types are policy types. The “set” type defines a domain 
scope expression, which can be used to specify actor, target and constraint elements. 
constant definition = 
int {identifier = expression ;} | 
real {identifier = expression ;} | 
string {identifier = expression ;} | 
boolean {identifier = expression ;} | 
set {identifier = domain_scope_expression ;}  
 
// examples of defining constants. 
 int maxLogin = 5; 
 string x = managerX.getName(); 
 string str1 = "this is a string"; 
 set targetSet1 = /subnetA/routers; 
 
Any of the constants described above, including the constraints and events described 
earlier, can be used to parameterize policy types. 
3.2 POLICE Policy Based Management System Architecture 
The deployment architecture supports the instantiation, distribution and life-cycle 
management of policies, as well as their enforcement by automated enforcement 
components. Police framework presents an implementation of the architecture and an 
integrated policy-administration toolkit. 
3.2.1 Architecture Overview 
This section describes general POLICE PBM architecture. Figure 3.1 illustrates the 
architecture of the management system. It includes three supporting services: a 
domain service, a policy service and an event service. The policy management 
service acts as the interface to policy management; it stores compiled policy classes, 
creates and distributes new policy objects. The “domain service” manages a 
distributed hierarchy of domain objects and supports the efficient evaluation of actor 
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and target sets at runtime. Each domain includes managed objects but also references 
to the PEPs and policy objects that currently apply to that domain. 
In concept, the domain service is similar to a directory service such as LDAP, with 
extensions to allow changes to the membership of a directory to be distributed to 
interested parties, e.g. via events. The “event service” collects and composes system 
events as well as those from the managed objects in the system, and forwards them to 
registered policy controllers to enforce policies. The event service exposes a 
publish/subscribe interface whereby policy controllers or other event services can 
subscribe to receive certain types of events. 
The user (i.e. policy administrator) interacts with the policy and domain services to 
design the domain structure, specify new policies, compile and store them in the 
domain service. Management tools interface with the two services and provide a 
graphical environment for specifying and managing policies. The distribution of 
policies is initiated through the policy management service. Policy Objects (POs) are 
generated and maintained by the policy service to manage policies at runtime. This 
includes the distribution of the policies to their enforcement components, and the 
handling of dynamic domain-membership changes to the objects to which the 
policies apply. The fact that policies explicitly define their actors and targets makes 
the automated distribution of policies possible. All kinds of policies are distributed to 
their actors. 
The entities that enforce policies are called Policy Controller (PC) and are 
distributed. PCs implement a policy enforcement interface to support loading, 
unloading, enabling and disabling of policy objects. 
Resource Controller intercepts the authorization requests from actor objects and 
forwards to the PCs in order perform checks on whether the access is permitted. PCs 
typically do not have to interface to lower-level mechanisms that really carry out the 
actions; for example a firewall protecting the services on its network, an operating 
system protecting its resources, or a database manager protecting its databases. A PC 
normally orders all the actors at its location and enforces all kinds of policies relating 
to them. 
The actors of a policy can be any objects that initiate invocations. PCs directly 
enforce all types of policies for an actor, and their architecture can be generic, 
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although they can be targeted to specific applications e.g. QoS, security or storage 
management. The enforcement of policies requires a PC to subscribe the event 
specifications with the event service. The event service notifies the PC of events 
which trigger its policies, and the PC is then perform the executing the actions 
defined by those policies if the constraints are evaluated as true. 
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Figure 3.1 Architecture of the Police framework 
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3.2.2 Architectural Analysis of Framework 
3.2.2.1 Policy Server 
The Police Policy Server acts as the interface to policy management, which stores 
compiled policy classes, creates and distributes new policy objects and otherwise 
supports policy management coordination. Policy Management Service creates a 
deliverable Deployment Object for each policy to be distributed. Policy Deployment 
Service coordinates the distribution of the deployment objects to the related PEPs‟.  
The Policy Management Console (PMC) provides a graphical interface for 
specifying, reviewing and modifying policies. Being integrated with both the 
Domain Service and the Police Compiler, the Management Console helps the 
administrators to define valid policies conforming to both information model of the 
entire system and the language syntax. Existing policies and policy types can be 
selected with the aid of the PMC, modified, recompiled and redistributed to 
enforcement points.  
By monitoring errors, events, conflicts, and the decisions made about conflicts at 
runtime, the administrator also uses the PMC to interact with the enforcement 
operations performed through the entire system. The design of the PMC also includes 
an Integrated Development Environment (IDE) tool allowing policy-programming. 
By using it, the administrators can create and modify policies of the system as if they 
write a code to be run on a distributed system. As relying on the Police language, the 
interface language of this IDE will support loop, if-else statements, and many other 
structures of an ordinary computer programming language. The language is called as 
Police Interface Language (PIL), since its statements are interpreted into Police 
policies. In the Figure 3.2, sample PIL statements are shown.  
A Command-Line Window is also provided to enter single-line commands for the 
Policy Management Server. This allows interactive management and monitoring of 
policy enforcement process. The PIL commands entered through this window will 
affect the enforcement process immediately. A “live interface” to whole system will 
be realized for the administrators to manipulate the system. 
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//... 
UserObject user1 = new UserObject(tdursun, Taner, DURSUN,...); 
DomainService.addElement (“\user\student”, user1); 
actor actor1 = (Actor) user1; 
 
when (host1.noUserSession()){ 
   actor1 cando host1.method1(); 
   actor1 cando host1.method3(); 
} 
 
for  (Target  t  in [target1, target2, ..., targetn]){ 
   actor1 cando  t.method2() when ; 
} 
//... 
Figure 3.2 Sample statements written in PIL 
 
3.2.2.2 Policy Compiler 
Policy Compiler is responsible for generating Java class for each policy defined 
through the PMC. Then, these Java classes are put in a deployment object and sent to 
enforcement platforms by the Policy Deployment Service.  
The fact that the language is high-level and platform independent, it imposes the 
design of a runtime representation for policies to enable distribution to the 
enforcement components, and make the interpretation of policies easy. Policies are 
enforced by automated management agents, and thus the enforcement code for these 
policies must be suitable for interpretation or execution by distributed enforcement 
components. A very attractive solution for the enforcement codes is the use of Java 
code, which can be distributed across networks and executed on any system with a 
Java virtual machine.  
One alternative is to generate a Java program for each of the policies specified, 
which can then be loaded into any agent for execution. The Java code provides 
interaction with the underlying event and domain services in order to enforce the 
policy. The generated Java program will be used in the same way Java mobile code 
is used to extend the functionality of the agents in the system in a plug-and-play 
fashion. Although this approach has some disadvantages such as security risks, it is 
attractive and the research on this type of implementation is a part of POLICE future 
work. 
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The POLICE compiler is implemented in Java and a default Java code generator is 
included to generate a Java object for each policy in order to satisfy the above 
requirement. The compiler has been integrated with a policy editor that simplifies 
policy specification. 
A policy is implemented in the runtime system as an object; the policy compiler 
generates a Java object which maintains a data-structure representation of each 
policy and stores it in the domain service. A policy object can then be accessed from 
the domain service and distributed to the Police PEPs (enforcement points 
responsible for enforcing that policy), and it enables other objects and components in 
the system to query it to determine the actor, target and other elements of the policy. 
The representation of policies as runtime objects follows the class hierarchy 
presented in Figure 3.3. The policy compiler creates an appropriate subclass from the 
class hierarchy for each of the user-defined policy types. 
Basic Policy
 name: String
 actor: ActorTarget
 actor: ActorTarget
 target: ActorTarget
 constraint: Constraint
Cando
actions : ObligActions
Mustdo
 actions: AuthActions
 
Figure 3.3 Policy Classes hierarchy generated by compiler 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the main modules of the policy compiler framework. The main 
phases of the compiler generate intermediate code, which is then passed on to the 
code-generator added to the compiler. The code assembler module is responsible for 
storing the generated code for a given policy in the domain service under the 
appropriate domain entry. Its implementation is thus specific to the domain service 
implementation. The default representation of a policy is the Java code. The 
components of the compiler implementation are illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
The compiler is based on a LALR(1) parser generated with SableCC [37], an object-
oriented Java parser by building a strictly-typed “abstract syntax tree” that matches 
the grammar of the language, automatically generates “tree-walker” classes and 
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enables the implementation of the actions on the nodes of the tree using inheritance. 
The SyntaxAnalyser, generated with SableCC using the grammar of the language 
parses a policy specification into an abstract syntax tree (AST) of Java objects. The 
AST is then passed on to the semantic analyzers. Semantic analysis is performed by 
handling the definition of names (scope analysis) and checking that policies contain 
all the required elements (completeness checks). After the completion of the scope 
analysis, type analysis is performed, and an intermediate code (IC) is generated. The 
IC is a tree structure of Java objects corresponding to the policies of the 
specification. The IC is passed on to the CodeGenerator which is enabled by the user 
to generate code. The code generator calls the Policy Service to store the generated 
code in the directory. A Java code generator generates a Java object representation of 
policies. Policy types are compiled into Java policy classes and stored in the domain 
hierarchy. Instantiation of a policy type creates and initializes a Java policy object. 
Predefined classes exist which implement the basic functionality for each of the 
classes corresponding to policy types. User-defined policy types are generated as 
Java classes which extend the appropriate basic policy class. For basic policies that 
are specified directly as instances, an unnamed Java class is generated in the 
background, and then instantiated. 
Syntax Analyzer
Policy Syntax Analysis
Semantic Analyzer
Scope, Type
Analysis
Java Code
GeneratorAST IC
Policy
Class
PolicyService
Domain
Service
AST : Abstract Syntax Tree
IC: Intermediate Code
 
Figure 3.4 Policy compiler structure 
 
The following is an example of an obligation policy type from the example scenario, 
and its generated Java code. Note that for each attribute type, the compiler builds an 
object that represents it. This object will then have to be serialized in some way to 
create the Java class (a static thing) and then reconstructed when the Java class is 
instantiated. In the following example it is assumed a method called “serialize” on 
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each of the object types to create a serialized representation of the object, and then a 
method reconstruct to re-create the object from that format. This can be simplified if 
we use the Serializable interface of Java. This will allow us to serialize and 
reconstruct an object using the build-in functionality of Java. Further investigation of 
this is required. 
type mustdo spaceExceedT(actor backupAdmin) { 
target ms = /system/servers/mailServer; 
action ms.notifyQuota(uid); 
when userExceedQuota(uid); 
} 
// backup administrator (actor) sends a notification to a 
user when that user’s disk space quota is exceeded.  
Figure 3.5 Example obligation policy 
The Java code generator receives the intermediate code constructed by the main 
phases of the compiler for the obligationpolicy shown in  Figure 3.5, and generates 
the Java class shown in Figure 3.6 as a subclass of the predefined Mustdo class 
(Figure 3.7). The mustdo class maintains the various policy elements and allows 
access to them. Since the objects for the various elements are already constructed, the 
Java code generator simply serializes them and then reconstructs them when the 
spaceExceedT class is instantiated, so that they can be set in the super class. 
 
import java.io.*; 
import java.util.LinkedList; 
import policeToolkit.compiler.codeGen.policyObjects.*; 
import policeToolkit.compiler.codeGen.policyObjects.events.*; 
import policeToolkit.compiler.codeGen.policyObjects.constraints.*; 
 
public class spaceExceedT extends Mustdo implements Serializable { 
public spaceExceedT(String name, ActorTarget backupAdmin) 
{ 
// set the name and domain path of the policy 
super(name, "/managementInfo/pol/man"); 
// any actual parameters to the instantiation are stored in a  
// linked list. 
LinkedList actualParams = new LinkedList(); 
actualParams.add(backupAdmin); 
super.setActualParams(actualParams); 
 
// set the actor object 
super.setActor(backupAdmin); 
 
// target policy element : bytes for serialised target object 
byte[] targetBytes = { 0xffffffac, 0xffffffed, 0x0, 0x5, 0x73, ... }; 
// reconstruct the target object 
ActorTarget target = null; 
try { 
  ByteArrayInputStream in=newByteArrayInputStream(targetBytes); 
  ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(in); 
  target = (ActorTarget)ois.readObject(); 
} catch (IOException e) { e.printStackTrace(); 
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e){e.printStackTrace();} 
super.setTarget(target); // set the target object 
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Figure 3.6 Generated Java code snapshot 
 
 
//The predefined classes are: 
 
public class Mustdo extends BasicPolicy implements MustdoI { 
MustdoActionI mustdoActions; 
EventI event; 
public Mustdo (ActorTargetI s, ActorTargetI t, ConstraintI c) 
{ 
  super(s, t, c); 
} 
public void setMustdoAction(MustdoActionI oa) 
{ 
  mustdoActions = oa; 
} 
public void setEvent(EventI e) 
{ 
  event = e; 
} 
... methods to implement the Interface go here 
} 
 
public class BasicPolicy implements BasicPolicyI { 
ActorTargetI actor; 
ActorTargetI target; 
ConstraintI constraint; 
public BasicPolicy (ActorTargetI s, ActorTargetI t, ConstraintI c) 
{ 
actor = s; 
target = t; 
constraint = c; 
} 
 
// action policy element : bytes for serialised action object 
byte[] actionBytes = { 0xffffffac, 0xffffffed, 0x0, 0x5, 0x73, ... }; 
// reconstruct the action object 
MustdoAction action = null; 
try { 
ByteArrayInputStream in =  
                      new ByteArrayInputStream(actionBytes); 
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(in); 
action = (MustdoAction)ois.readObject(); 
} catch (IOException e){ e.printStackTrace(); 
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e){ e.printStackTrace(); } 
// set the action object 
super.setActions(action); 
 
// constraint policy element: bytes for serialised constraint object 
byte[] constraintBytes = { 0xffffffac, 0xffffffed, 0x0, 0x5, 0x73 ... 
}; 
// reconstruct the constraint object 
Constraint constraint = null; 
try { 
ByteArrayInputStream in = new ByteArrayInputStream(constraintBytes); 
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(in); 
constraint = (Constraint)ois.readObject(); 
} catch (IOException e) { e.printStackTrace();  
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) { e.printStackTrace(); } 
super.setConstraint(constraint); //set the constraint object 
} 
} 
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... methods to implement the Interface go here 
} 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Predefined classes 
 
Police uses an integrated development environment (IDE) which is a modified 
version of the system developed by Ponder group for the specification of policies. 
The policy editor tool is integrated with our policy compiler and provides an easy to 
use development environment for specifying, reviewing and modifying policies. 
Templates can be used to create policies easily, and the domain browser can be 
invoked to select the subject and target domains for policies. Existing policies and 
policy types can be selected from the directory with the aid of the domain browser, 
loaded into the editor, modified, recompiled and stored back to the directory. Code 
generators added to the compiler framework, are accessible and can be enabled from 
within the editor to select the type of code to be generated. 
SableCC is an object-oriented compiler framework developed at School of Computer 
Science McGill University, Montreal [37]. It is an object-oriented framework that 
generates compilers (and interpreters) in the Java programming language. This 
framework is based on two fundamental design decisions. Firstly, the framework 
uses object-oriented techniques to automatically build a strictly typed “abstract 
syntax tree” (AST) that matches the grammar of the compiled language and 
simplifies debugging. Secondly, the framework generates “tree-walker” classes using 
an extended version of the “visitor design” [45] pattern which enables the 
implementation of actions on the nodes of the AST using inheritance. These two 
design decisions lead to a tool that supports a shorter development cycle for 
constructing compilers. Written in Java language, the SableCC includes all the 
following features:  
 Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA) based lexers with full Unicode 
support and lexical states.  
 Extended Backus-Naur Form grammar syntax. (Supports the *, ? and + 
operators).  
 LALR(1) based parsers.  
 Automatic generation of strictly-typed abstract syntax trees.  
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 Automatic generation of tree-walker classes.  
As a new approach for compiler tools, the compiler place in the development cycle 
has been reduced to merely build an initial object-oriented framework that is based 
solely on the lexical and grammatical definition of the compiled language. This has 
the advantage of limiting framework modifications to the case where the grammar of 
the compiled language is changed. 
In the generated framework: 
 The parser automatically builds the AST of the compiled program. 
 Each AST node is strictly typed, ensuring no corruption occurs in the tree. 
 Each analysis is written in its own class. Writing a new analysis requires only 
extending some tree walker class and providing methods to do the work at 
appropriate nodes. 
 Storage of analysis information is kept in the analysis class itself, outside the 
definition of node types. This ensures no modification to a node type is 
needed when a new analysis is added to or removed from the compiler. 
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Figure 3.8 Steps to create a compiler using SableCC 
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The framework makes extensive use of object-oriented design patterns to achieve 
modularity of code. The resulting compiler becomes a very maintainable compiler. 
Producing a compiler using SableCC requires the following steps (as shown in 
Figure 3.8): 
1. Creating a SableCC specification file containing the lexical definitions and 
the grammar of the language to be compiled. 
2. Launching SableCC on the specification file to generate a framework. 
3. Creating one or more working classes, possibly inheriting from classes 
generated by SableCC. 
4. Creating a main compiler class that activates lexer, parser and working 
classes. 
5. Compiling the compiler with a Java compiler. 
3.2.2.3 Domain Service and Policy Repository 
The Domain Service maintains policies and other enforcement data such as 
information model of the managed system. Thus, LDAP is used for both storing 
policies and for grouping actor/target objects whereas the IETF framework uses 
directories only as policy repositories.  
In large-scale systems it is not practical to specify policies for individual objects and 
so there is a need to be able to group objects to which a policy applies [46]. Domains 
provide a flexible means of grouping objects to which policies apply and can be used 
to partition the objects in a large system according to geographical boundaries, object 
type, responsibility and authority or for the convenience of human managers. The 
benefits of the domain-based approach are [46]: 
 a policy applying to a domain will propagate to its sub-domains thus 
applying to large numbers of objects and providing scalability and,  
 by moving an object from one domain to another its policies will be 
automatically replaced with those applying to the new domain, without the 
need to modify the policies or manually manage the association between 
policy and managed objects.  
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 when new objects are added or removed from the system they can simply be 
included or removed from relevant domains, without the need to modify the 
policies or manually manage the association between policy and managed 
objects. 
Membership of a domain is not defined in terms of a predicate on object attributes. 
A domain does not encapsulate the objects it contains but merely holds references to 
object interfaces, and it is thus very similar in concept to a file system directory but 
may hold references to any type of object. A domain, which is a member of another 
domain, is called a subdomain of the parent domain. A subdomain is not a subset of 
the parent domain, in that an object included in a subdomain is not a direct member 
of the parent domain, but is an indirect member. Path names are used to identify 
domains, e.g., /domain2/domain1, where „/‟ is used as a delimiter for domain 
path names. Policies normally propagate to members of subdomains.  
Domain scope expressions (DSE) introduced in [47] are used to combine domains to 
form a set of objects for applying a policy to (i.e. for the specification of 
actors/targets of policies). Domain scope expressions can be used to combine 
domains to form a set of objects for applying a policy, using union, intersection and 
difference operators, e.g., a scope expression @/lan/routers + @/wan/routers 
would apply to members of both domains and @/hardware/routers ^ 
@/lan/routers applies only to the direct and indirect members of the overlap 
between the two domains. In Police the domain scope expression is adopted as in the 
Ponder except several simplifications. 
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Figure 3.9 Sample domain structure 
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The Domain Service manages a distributed hierarchy of domains and supports 
efficient evaluation of actor and target sets at runtime or policy specification phase. 
A sample domain structure is shown in Figure 3.9. The policy enforcement 
mechanism must interact with target objects, both invoking operations and querying 
attributes. Thus, the Policy Management Server must have a priori knowledge of the 
managed objects in interface level, before the policies are specified. This is achieved 
with an information model stored in the Domain Service. 
In the Domain Service, the managed objects are represented with classes, so-called 
Model Classes which define an element schema of the managed objects. Each model 
class must include the real management interfaces implemented by the real object 
without implementation details as shown in Figure 3.10.  
Class SerialPort { 
int portCount; 
//... 
public openPort (int portID); 
public closePort (int portID) throw 
Exception; 
//... 
} 
 
//sample relationship 
Relation between Object1.method1 and 
Object2.method3; 
Figure 3.10 Model class for a serial port and a relationship 
 
The information stored in the Domain Service relevant to the entire management 
process is defined under the term of System Information Model (SIM). This is 
composed of a meta information model including management components (PC) and 
policies, as well as a management schema including managed objects which 
participate in the management process and relationships between them. The 
relationships between managed objects are the essential elements of Police conflict 
handling method. Figure 3.11 shows a diagram for the management schema. 
In the meta model, everything is defined as a managed object. This includes 
domains, policies and managed objects. A domain may include any number of 
managed objects, for which the domain is the parent. Policies are defined over sets of 
objects formed by applying set operations, such as union, intersection and difference 
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to the objects within domains. Actors and targets of policies are defined in terms of 
domains, and this is indicated with the dependency line in the figure. Enforcement 
components are responsible for the enforcement of policies in the runtime 
management system. Policy management components are automated components 
responsible for enforcing policies. Basic policies are distributed to the enforcement 
components, hence the usage path line between the enforcement component class 
and the basic policy class. 
In the management schema, the managed objects are represented with Model Classes 
as explained above. In addition, the application specific relationships are described 
between the managed objects and their methods. A node discovery mechanism and 
administrator intervention capability (for the nodes not supporting auto discovery) is 
employed to keep the element schemata up-to-date. 
As mentioned before, the SIM models the information of the system to be managed 
with policies. For referencing purposes, the model classes to be put in the Domain 
Service will fulfill the requirements of Common Information Model of DMTF.  
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Figure 3.11 A graphical representation of sample management schema 
3.2.2.4 Policy Deployment Service 
The distribution of policies is initiated by the policy management service and 
performed by Policy Deployment Service. Policy Objects (POs) are generated and 
maintained by the policy service to manage policies at runtime. This includes the 
distribution of the policies to their enforcement components, and the handling of 
dynamic domain-membership changes to the objects to which the policies apply. The 
fact that policies explicitly define their actors and targets makes the automated 
distribution of policies possible. All kind of policies are distributed to their actors. 
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3.2.2.5 Police Policy Enforcement Point (PPEP) 
The PPEP is the enforcement point of our model and a Policy Management Server 
can handle more than one PPEP. PPEP design and implementation is subject to my 
thesis and PPEP is explained in detail in next sections. 
3.2.3 Policy Distribution 
Both cando and mustdo policies are distributed in the same uniform way to the PCs 
near the actors that it makes our architecture simpler. 
Policy Management Service generates a policy enforcement object for each policy 
that Policy Deployment Service distributes to the related enforcement platforms. The 
PPEPs analyze the deployment objects they receive and enlarge their behavior 
according to the content of them.  
Domain Server stores the relations between the PPEPs and managed devices. Each 
managed device has one PPEP and each PPEP controls only one device. Managed 
device include multiple managed nodes in it. This information can be entered to 
Domain Server manually or PPEP registers itself to Domain Server on startup. On 
registering process PPEP send the managed nodes it has the control and the events 
that can be created by the managed device.  
When Deployment Service is about to send an enforcement object to a managed 
device, firstly it learns the PPEP that is responsible for that device from the Domain 
Server. PPEP is searched from the Domain Server according to the “actor” of the 
policy. 
3.3 Conflict Handling 
Policy conflict occurs when the actions of two rules (that are both satisfied 
simultaneously) contradict each other.  The entity implementing the policy would not 
be able to determine which action to perform.  The implementers of policy systems 
must provide conflict detection and avoidance or resolution mechanisms to prevent 
this situation.  "Policy conflict" is contrasted with "policy error" [3]. 
Policy errors occur when attempts to enforce policy actions fail, whether due to 
temporary state or permanent mismatch between the policy actions and the device 
enforcement capabilities [3].  
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3.3.1 Conflict Classes 
Main conflict classes [38] are modality conflicts and objective conflicts.  
Modality Conflicts [38,39] may arise if there are both positive and negative 
authorization or obligation policies with same actors, targets and actions. Modality 
conflicts can be detected through static, syntactic analysis of the policy 
specifications. Most existing work in detecting conflicts relates to modality conflicts. 
Due to nonexistence of negative policies, Police does not suffer from modality 
conflicts. 
Application-Specific Conflicts arise from the semantics of the policies. They cannot 
be determined directly from the policy specifications without additional information 
specifying what conflict is. In the literature, the Metapolicy [38,39] concept is used 
to represent this additional information, which is a constraint about permitted 
policies (policies about policies).  
In [38], it is claimed that if there is not common object of two policies (disjoint 
policies) there is no possibility of conflict too.  But, we think that this assumption is 
not true for some application-specific conflicts. There may be implicit relationships 
between objects and consequently between policies applied to them. This may cause 
application-specific conflicts implicitly.  
One example for application specific conflicts can be expressed as “There should be 
no policy pair authorizing an actor to perform two separate operations that must be 
performed by different actors” [39]. If one policy says “accountants can sign a 
cheque” and another policy says “accountants can write a cheque” but there may be 
another policy saying “same accountant cannot write and sign a cheque”. In this case 
the first policies allow an accountant to write and sign a cheque but these two 
conflict the last one. 
Metapolicy-based approach cannot always fulfill the requirements to solve the 
problem of application-specific conflicts. Since, the administrator must specify 
metapolicies for all possible runtime situations, which may result in conflicts. It is 
almost impossible for the administrators to overlook all implicit relationships may 
cause conflicts in the system being managed. Moreover, in many cases, the fact that 
there are policies related to each other does not mean a conflict will occur at runtime. 
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In contrast to working groups using meta-policy concept to solve application-specific 
conflicts, we have developed a novel policy conflict detection mechanism based on 
the relationships between the objects of the system to be managed. On considering 
these associations among actors or targets, the relationships between the policies to 
be enforced on these objects can also be determined. Because, object relationships 
implicitly show the relationships of policies applied to them. The Policy Controllers 
investigate the likelihood of conflicts at runtime by analyzing the relations between 
policies. Then, they enforce their actors according to this analysis.  
3.3.2 Police Conflict Handling Method 
Due to nonexistence of negative policy concept, Police language does not suffer from 
modality conflicts. In case of application-specific conflicts, in contrast to working 
groups using meta-policy concept, a different policy conflict detection mechanism is 
developed [33]. This method is based on the relationships between the objects of the 
system being managed.  
In order to make Police Conflict Detection model run, all associations between 
managed objects must already be modeled in Domain Service before specifying 
policies. By evaluating these associations, direct or indirect relationships between the 
policies to be enforced on these objects can also be determined. The Policy 
Controllers (PCs), enforcement agents, investigate the likelihood of conflicts at 
runtime by analyzing these relations between policies. Then, they enforce their actors 
according to the result of these investigations. To do this, the PCs must first look for 
any relationship interesting the managed objects referenced in the policies for which 
these PCs are responsible. If there is an association, a PC has to get and run the 
Evaluation Code related to that association from the repository. On running the 
Evaluation Codes, the real runtime situations about the conflicts can be obtained. 
Unlike Ponder performing a static conflict analysis on policies at Policy Server, 
postponing the decision of whether there is any conflict, until enforcement time 
makes Police model more consistent and reliable. In addition, using Evaluation Code 
concept, instead of meta-policies provides more flexibility. 
Thus, the policy conflict analysis is performed in a distributed manner. The 
administrators specifying policies do not have to worry about possible conflicts. The 
policy conflict analysis logic is embedded into the managed system itself. 
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4 ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM OF DIFFERENT SYSTEMS 
Policy enforcement is the execution of a policy decision and Policy Enforcement 
Point is a logical entity running on or within a resource (e.g., device) that enforces 
policy decisions and/or makes a configuration change.  
In this chapter following Policy Based Management systems are studied: Active 
PBM [17], PONDER [48], Script MIB, HP OpenView PolicyXpert and IPHighway 
Open Policy System. For each framework, general architecture and the Policy 
Enforcement Point architecture is given.  
4.1 Active PBM 
Active PBM [17] presents a solution using Active Network Technology to facilitate 
the deployment of PBM. This approach considers the network as an active part and a 
manageable resource of the running services and not only a passive communication 
tube and intends to use capsules (active packets) as a flexible way to exchange 
policies via the network. This section aims to describe Active PBM which is mostly 
related with SLA (Service Level Agreement) and QoS and policies related with 
them. 
Active networking emerged from discussions within the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) research community. The aim of the Active Networking 
today effort is to design, develop and implement new communication architectures 
that allow rapid, safe and dependable creation, reconfiguration, and deployment of 
advanced networking services, protocols and management components.  
The Active Networking paradigm achieves this goal on one hand through the 
concepts of self-directing data units called Capsule, and Open Programmable Nodes. 
Active packets can direct their own processing and deliver new services to the 
interior network nodes. 
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Programmable Nodes permit remote and secure processing and building of enhanced 
network services from generic network software elements. The conjunction of these 
concepts will ultimately result into networks with greatly improved communication 
services that meet user requirements efficiently and securely [49]. This is motivated 
by the desire to solve some of the problems encountered in large scale distributed 
and real-time systems such as the volume and complexity of the tasks, latency, 
delays, and others. 
The majority of current communication system architectures employ the client-server 
method that requires multiple transactions before a given task can be accomplished. 
This can lead to increase signaling traffic throughout the network. This problem can 
rapidly escalate in an open network environment that spans multiple domains. As an 
alternative solution, active networking can shift the computations or interactions to 
the remote host by moving the execution there. The main motivation of the use of 
active networking technology in this work is driven by the desire to automate the 
control and management processes by allowing for more programmability of the 
network to rapidly customize the provision of new information and 
telecommunication services [50]. Hence, capsules can also be used to implement 
Service Level Agreements (SLAs, a formal negotiated agreement between two 
parties) [51] between different actors of the network and service era. Capsules can 
then be used as brokers or mediators between end users and service providers in 
order to implement the SLA. In this way, complex QoS metrics specifications (from 
end user‟s point of view) can be transferred in a simplified manner. ISP nodes can 
therefore negotiate with users‟ node in order to meet the required service [52]. 
4.1.1 Active PBM Architecture 
The system architecture shown Figure 4.1 comprises two main components, the PEP 
and the PDP. These two environments differ mainly in term of functionality‟s and 
localization. In fact the PEP environment is located at the router boundary while the 
PDP environment is a standalone system. The PDP (Policy Decision) can enforce 
policies in the network by sending capsules to PEP (Policy Enforcement Point) 
enabled IP routers.  
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Figure 4.1 Architecture of Inter-domain A-PBM 
The open architecture defines a set of active services and capsules depending on their 
respective roles in the architecture: 
 Local PEP Active Service: It is an Active Service that performs local routine 
control/management PEP functions. It performs mainly metering and 
enforcement functions as well as the sending of PEP capsule when it needs to 
interact with the Local PDP active services manager for decisions. 
 PEP Capsules: These are used mainly as autonomous negotiator capsules 
between PEP and PDP within the same domain. The PEP Capsules are used 
to obtain decisions from PDP. The PEP Capsule carries all the information 
regarding the ongoing connection. It is sent by the PEP to the PDP in order to 
notify a particular event in the network (RSVP opening request [53], QoS 
degradation, etc). 
 Local PDP Active Service Manager: It is an Active Service that takes 
decision regarding the information that is carried out by the PEP Capsules. It 
interacts with the various databases (policy rules DataBase , MIB, security 
DB, etc) in order to retrieve the rules that can be triggered. Once the 
decisions are identified, it sends this by the PEP Capsules. If any 
configuration related to new policies is defined, it sends PDP Capsules, to 
remote PEP Active Services to perform the new configuration. It takes also 
into account inter-domain interactions, when a decision needs to be 
negotiated with remote domain PDP Active Services Manager. When 
interacting with remote domain, it sends PDP Inter-Domain Capsules. 
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 PDP capsules: When a PDP active service has taken a decision it sends a PDP 
capsule to enforce policies directly in the PEP active services component in 
all the network elements that are concerned by this new decision. 
 PDP Inter-Domain capsules: When a PDP has to take a decision related to an 
inter-domain connection, it has to identify the set of remote domain need for 
the connection and send an Inter-Domain capsule to negotiate the term of 
services needed by the customer. 
4.1.1.1 Operation of Active PBM 
In the case of two ISP domains interconnecting the customers premise networks, the 
deployment of the different capsule in the global distributed architecture is described 
below. 
The local PDP active services manager is responsible for collecting information 
related to the entire domain. If any change occurs in the network such as an RSVP 
connection request, the local PEP active services on the ingress router sends a PEP 
capsule to the PDP active services manager. The sent capsule contains all the 
information needed to identify the source of the request (customer) and the 
destination of the call (calling party) as well the parameters related to this event (for 
example QoS parameters for the request RSVP connection). Based on this 
information, the local PDP active services manager retrieve related information and 
policies from the policy DB, the MIB and the security server using different types of 
protocols such as LDAP, SNMP or any other protocol that permit to retrieve 
information from a database. Then, the local PDP active services manager tries to 
trigger any policy rule that can be triggered regarding the information carried by the 
PEP capsule. If the connection doesn't span a different ISP domain, the PEP capsule 
is sent back with the response to the local PEP active services. If the decision needs 
to interact with remote ISP, the local PDP active services manager sends a PDP inter-
domain capsule to remote ISPs with all information related to the requested service 
as well as information permitting to identify the initiating domain. The remote local 
PDP active services manager gets the necessary information from the remote 
(received) PDP inter-domain capsule. According to this information, it tries to trigger 
any policy rule that defines the ISP-to-ISP policy rules between this ISP and the 
initiating ISP defined within the SLA. If the service is accepted the PDP inter-
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domain capsule is sent back to its domain with all the information related to the 
decision. The local PDP active services manager retrieves the information and takes 
a final decision regarding the request service. 
When the final decision is taken, local PDP active services manager of each domain 
that intervened in the final decision has to configure its own equipment in order to 
enable the customer service to be operational. This means for instance to enforce 
policy directly into equipment using PDP capsule. Consequently PDP capsule will 
move from equipment to another in order to enforce locally the policy by interacting 
with the local PEP active services. 
4.1.2 Policy Enforcement Point architecture 
Policy carried by capsules will force the PEP to enforce local differentiation 
regarding the inbound user packets. Thus it is possible to differentiate between user 
packets and adapt the provided QoS depending on the ISP policies and the SLA 
agreed with the customers.  
Active PBM PEP receives a Policy Capsule in two ways:  
 PEP sends a request to PDP and PDP sends the Policy Capsule back after a 
query in the DataBases or an Inter Domain communication. This way uses 
outsourcing policy execution approach. 
 PDP makes a decision and sends the Policy Capsule directly to PEP. This is 
provisioning execution approach. 
When the service requested by a customer span a number of ISPs, a negotiation 
process is launched between the ISPs. The goal of this process is to find out the best 
choices (route, price, etc) to ensure that the QoS requested by the customer in the 
SLA will be fullfiled.  
The PEP environment is designed light in the sense that it should not require a lot 
processing and memory resources and should be as fast as possible. 
The execution environment at the PEP point is an active node with agency services. 
The architecture is shown in Figure 4.2. The agency services are DMIB objects 
located in the router. In this scheme, an active node ANTS [54] based on a Java 
Virtual Machine (JVM) is proposed as a middleware solution. Based on the PDP 
decision, the local PEP services assign a policy to users' connection. In order to have 
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a standard interface between the capsules deployed on the router and the embedded 
hardware and software, an Object Request Broker (ORB) is used between the JVM 
and the Kernel. The reason for using an ORB is to provide in one hand all the 
support for services management and mobility and on the other hand a standard L 
interface [55] to interact with router kernel, since there is a wide variety of hardware 
and software within routers from different vendors. 
 
Figure 4.2 PEP environment architecture 
4.2 PONDER 
PONDER deployment model is developed by Imperial College and is object-oriented 
and addresses the instantiation, distribution and enabling of policies as well as the 
disabling, unloading and deletion of policies. It forms part of the run-time support for 
Ponder language for specifying both management and security policies. Policies 
apply to domains of objects, and a policy applying to a domain will propagate to all 
objects of that domain including objects of nested subdomains. Both domains and 
policies are mapped to objects [48,56]. 
4.2.1 PONDER System Architecture 
Ponder has four basic policy types: authorizations, obligations, refrains and 
delegations and three composite policy types: roles, relationships and management 
structures that are used to compose policies; domains for hierarchically grouping 
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managed objects, events for triggering obligation policies, and constraints for 
controlling the enforcement of policies at runtime. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the architecture of the management system. It includes three 
supporting services: a domain service, a policy service and an event service. The 
“policy service” acts as the interface to policy management; it stores compiled policy 
classes, creates and distributes new policy objects. The “domain service” manages a 
distributed hierarchy of domain objects and supports the efficient evaluation of 
subject and target sets at run-time. Each domain object holds references to its 
managed objects but also references to the policy objects that currently apply to the 
domain. In concept, the domain service is similar to a directory service such as 
LDAP, with extensions to allow changes to the membership of a directory to be 
distributed to interested parties, e.g. via events. The domain service can also be 
implemented by database systems. The “event service” collects and composes system 
events as well as those from the managed objects in the system, and forwards them to 
registered policy management components to trigger obligation policies. The event 
service exposes a publish/subscribe interface whereby clients can subscribe to 
receive certain types of events. 
 
Figure 4.3 PONDER Management system architecture 
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4.2.2 PONDER Enforcement Architecture 
Enforcement agents are objects that implement a policy enforcement interface. This 
interface supports the loading, enabling and disabling of enforcement objects 
disseminated from policy objects. In PONDER enforcement objects are created by 
policy objects and moved to enforcement agents when the policy loading is 
requested. Enforcement agents store the passed enforcement objects in a local policy 
table and forward most policy operations to corresponding methods implemented by 
the enforcement object. Compiled enforcement classes provide the implementation 
code for enforcing policies and can be target-dependent and subject dependent. Thus 
a policy may have different implementations of the policy enforcement class. In 
order to handle dynamic changes in domain object membership, the policy 
enforcement interface also has methods for the addition and removal of objects.  
 
Figure 4.4 Overview of policy deployment model 
As shown in Figure 4.4 for obligation policies, Policy Management Agents (PMAs) 
register with an event service to receive relevant events generated from the managed 
objects of the system. On receiving an event, the PMA queries the domain service to 
determine the target objects used in the obligation method and performs the policy 
actions, provided no constraint or refrain policy prevents the action. When a 
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managed object is about to perform an action on another object, first it gets access 
permission from access controller. 
The Event Service collects and composes events from the underlying systems and 
from the managed objects in the system, and forwards them to registered policy 
management agents triggering obligation policies. After a policy object is 
instantiated, it can be loaded into its enforcement agents, and once loaded, it can be 
enabled causing its enforcement agents to actively implement it. An enabled policy 
can be disabled and later re-enabled, or disabled and then unloaded, removing it from 
its enforcement agents. Unloaded (i.e. dormant) policies can either be reloaded or 
deleted. Figure 4.5 shows all the states for a policy object. 
 
Figure 4.5 Policy object states 
4.2.2.1 Policy Management Agents (for Obligation and Refrain Policies) 
Policy management agents enforce all the enabled refrain and obligation methods for 
a subject. An overview of the operation of a policy management agent (PMA) is 
shown in Figure 4.6. The enforcement objects for obligation policies and refrain 
policies (Obligation Enforcement Objects (OEOs) & Refrain Enforcement Objects 
(REOs)) are loaded from corresponding policy objects (Obligation Policy Objects 
(OPOs) & Refrain Policy Objects (RPOs)) and stored locally (1). When an obligation 
policy is enabled its obligation enforcement object registers the obligation event 
specification along with a reference to an event handler with the event service (2). 
The event service processes events (3) and disseminates them to handlers based on 
their event specifications (4). On receiving an event, handlers check both the 
constraints of the obligation policy and all enabled REOs within the agent to check if 
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any REO disallows actions within the obligation method (5 & 6). If constraints and 
refrains allow, the event handler then calls the obligation method, which performs 
actions on managed objects (7, 8). Two interactions are omitted from Figure 4.6. 
Firstly, the event handler in the PMA queries the domain service in order to evaluate 
the target set on which actions are to be invoked i.e., the event handler effectively 
coordinates the execution of the obligation policy. Secondly, obligation policies are 
allowed to invoke actions internal to the PMA. 
 
Figure 4.6 Overview of a Policy Management Agent 
 
4.2.2.2 Access Controllers (for Authorization Policies) 
Access controllers enforce all the authorization policies for one or more target 
objects. Access controllers are normally co-located with the targets that they protect. 
Unlike policy management agents, which can be generic, access controllers require 
close interaction with the underlying access control mechanism, for example, with 
the host operating system, or a firewall, or the method dispatch mechanism of a 
programming language. The means used to interact with each mechanism will vary. 
Access controllers follow the general approach for all enforcement agents. They 
implement the policy enforcement interface and provide methods to load, enable, 
disable and unload authorization enforcement objects (AEOs) similarly to PMAs and 
OEOs, except that AEOs are not event-driven. Authorization enforcement objects 
also provide methods for evaluating constraints and handling authorization filters. 
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When an action is “intercepted” by an access controller, it calls a “checkAccess” 
method to check whether the access should be permitted. This method will check, for 
example, that the subject of the action is in the subject set of the policy, that the 
target of the action is in the target set of the policy and that the action is a valid 
action for the target. The method will also evaluate all policy constraints and enforce 
any global rules for the systems, for example that access to the target object must 
only allowed if there is a positive authorization that allows the subject to perform the 
action on the target object, and no negative authorization that forbids the subject 
from performing the action. 
4.3 Script MIB 
The IETF has developed several specifications for policy-based configuration 
management. In addition, an infrastructure for distributed management by delegation 
has been specified. Script MIB Policy Based Management framework combines key 
concepts developed in these two efforts and proposes a policy-based configuration 
management architecture built upon the distributed management infrastructure. Two 
prototype implementations for managing differentiated services are discussed and 
evaluated [24]. 
The first solution is closely related to the SNMPconf approach. Policies are defined 
as programs.  These are downloaded as ‟scripts‟ via the Script MIB and then 
executed by a common Script MIB runtime engine. The runtime acts as a PDP and 
sends configuration information to a local or remote PEP. 
The second solution builds upon the Policy Core Information Model (PCIM). 
Policies are not defined as programs, but as groups of PCIM objects. Such policies 
stored in a repository are downloaded using the Script MIB directly to managed 
nodes. There, an interpreter for this special kind of ‟scripts‟ combines PDP and PEP 
functionality [24]. 
4.3.1 Script MIB System Architecture 
The general architecture of the Script MIB based policy system is shown in Figure 
4.7. This approach is based on the Jasmin Java runtime engine. Hence, policies are 
Java programs edited and compiled on a manager host. The created jar-Files are 
served to the Jasmin agents by a policy repository via HTTP. When the agent 
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activates a policy, e.g. on demand of a manager, it forks a Jasmin Java runtime 
engine and forces it via SMX to start a given Java “script” from the local script 
storage. To control and monitor the execution of policies, the management 
application communicates with the agent(s) via SNMP. 
The policy specific components lie within the Java runtime engine, which makes use 
of Java class packages that support policies. A general policy package contains a 
number of abstract classes that represent policies (with their rules, conditions, and 
actions), events, and elements. Besides these abstract classes, domain-specific 
packages contain derived element and event classes, e.g. to represent classifiers, 
meters, markers, etc. in case of a DiffServ specific policy package. These domain-
specific classes along with classes from the generic policy package, like time event 
classes, are used by policy “scripts”. 
The interaction between the domain-specific classes and the managed devices is 
based on interface drivers hidden from the package API. This allows supporting 
different interfaces, e.g., SNMP, COPS-PR, local APIs or CLIs, without the need to 
adopt policy scripts to these interfaces or protocols [57]. 
The policy manager must be aware of the roles associated to each network element, 
since it performs a policy selection in order to know which policies each agent must 
retrieve. The concept of roles is used to select the policies which apply to a certain 
network element and therefore need to be downloaded to the Script MIB agent. The 
policy management application needs to keep track of the roles of the network 
elements controlled by the Script MIB agent, and what policies apply for what role. 
The Script MIB agent acts as PDP, retrieving policies from an HTTP or File Transfer 
Protocol (FTP) server that is acting as a policy repository. The runtime engine of the 
Script MIB agent is a policy engine that evaluates the policies delegated to it as 
„scripts‟. A policy evaluation may require monitoring network elements and 
executing actions by sending configuration messages to the network elements. 
As shown in Figure 4.8, there are two manager-agent relationships, one between 
policy manager and PDP and one between PDP and PEP. For communication 
between policy manager and PDP, SNMP and the Script MIB are used. For 
communication between PDP and PEP several alternatives can be used: SNMP, 
COPS-PR, SSH/CLI, or a local interface, if PDP and PEP are co-located. 
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Figure 4.7 Architecture of PBM based on the JASMIN Java runtime engine. 
While there is only one instance of policy manager and policy repository, there may 
be multiple PDPs and for each PDP there may be multiple PEPs. The architecture 
covers three levels of PDP distribution shown in Figure 4.9: (a) centralized with just 
a single PDP, (b) weakly distributed with several PDPs, but much less than the 
number of PEPs, and (c) strongly distributed with one PDP per PEP. 
For centralized policy management there is no specific advantage in using the Script 
MIB compared to other policy management systems. Weakly distributed policy 
management is more scalable. The central PDP in (a) may become a bottleneck, if 
the number of policies and/or the number of PEPs increase too much. In (b) the 
bottleneck is removed by distributing the load to as many PDPs as required. 
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Figure 4.8 Architecture of the Script MIB based configuration management. 
 
Figure 4.9 Different levels of PDP distribution. 
In case of strongly distributed policy management, all network elements hosting a 
PEP also host a PDP. Here, no standardized communication between PDP and PEP is 
required anymore, because local proprietary communication may be used. The 
scalability is still higher than in (a) because policy information is considered to be 
more condense than the configuration information derived from it and because the 
policy manager now can select which policy to send to which network element. For 
example, in a DiffServ network management system with all routers hosting PDPs 
and PEPs, core routers would only receive and evaluate core router policies, while 
edge routers receive different and potentially more complex policies. 
4.3.2 Enforcement (Policy Engine) 
There are two approaches for the policy engine in Script MIB (Figure 4.10). 
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The first approach represents policies by program code. This matches the typical use 
of the Script MIB. A policy or a group of policies are represented by a program that 
is passed as a “script” to a Script MIB agent. At the agent the program is executed by 
a runtime engine for the used programming language. This runtime engine must 
provide a way of accessing the network elements to be configured by the policies, 
e.g. by offering a specific library. 
The second approach represents policies by objects. A policy or a group of policies 
are represented by a set of objects. Again, the set is passed as a “script” to a Script 
MIB agent. There, the objects are evaluated by a specific policy runtime engine. The 
objects representing policies conform to PCIM, they contain data only and no code. 
Also, they are specific to an application domain, e.g. Policy QoS Information Model 
(QPIM) [58] for QoS. The policy runtime engine must contain implementations of all 
PCIM policy classes that are to be evaluated, and it must have access to the network 
elements to be configured by these policies. 
 
Figure 4.10 Two different approaches to PBM with the Script MIB. 
 
4.3.2.1 Policies as Program Codes 
This approach, shown in Figure 4.11, is based on an existing Script MIB runtime 
engine. Policies are represented as scripts written in a language supported by that 
runtime engine. A general policy management language extension provides 
interfaces for deriving and implementing policies, rules, conditions, actions, network 
elements, event generators and events. Domain specific language extensions provide 
abstract interfaces to network elements of a specific policy application domain. They 
allow policy scripts to retrieve element attributes and event notifications and to 
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correlate them to make policy decisions, so that they can in turn be used to configure 
network elements. Drivers realize the mapping between the domain specific 
interfaces and the underlying device-level mechanism to actually configure the 
network elements. 
 
Figure 4.11 The standard Script MIB runtime engine 
4.3.2.2 Policies as Objects 
In the second approach, policies are coded not as programs running independently of 
each other, but as objects (or sets of objects) that are executed by a single policy 
evaluation process, see Figure 4.12. Therefore, the runtime engine cannot be 
anymore an interpreter of a common programming language. A special runtime 
engine for policy objects is required. In order to use existing standards as much as 
possible, PCIM and standards derived from PCIM is chosen as information model for 
the policy objects. Implementations of the classes these objects are instances of, must 
be available at the runtime engine. The policy evaluation process executes policy 
actions by using application domain specific interfaces. The functions that the policy 
runtime engine must offer are: 
 Monitor domain specific attributes using domain specific objects that 
represent the configuration state of the network elements controlled by the 
Script MIB agent. These objects might use driver functions to provide an 
abstract interface to configure the underlying specific domain 
implementation. 
 75 
 Receive orders from the Script MIB agent to add, remove, enable or disable 
policies. 
 Handle the triggering of policies. The event that triggers the evaluation of a 
policy is encoded within the delegated policy object. 
 Identify the set of target domain objects to which the triggered policy applies. 
The role of the policy is specified within the policy object. 
 Compare the values of selected domain object attributes with the conditions 
specified within the triggered policy object. 
 Execute the actions of a policy rule after the corresponding condition was 
evaluated to true. In general these actions are performed by modifying certain 
attributes of the domain objects regarding the information encoded in the 
policy action. 
 Prioritize policies according to their priority attribute. 
 
Figure 4.12 Implementation of the policy runtime engine.  
 
4.4 HP OpenView PolicyXpert 
PolicyXpert is a policy management system developed by Hewlett Packard [59]. HP 
OpenView PolicyXpert provides a way to manage the network by authoring and 
distributing policies, and getting feedback on that policy in the actual network 
environment. 
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4.4.1 PolicyXpert System Architecture 
There are three major components in the PolicyXpert architecture, Policy Console, 
Policy Server and Policy Agents. These components are described below: 
• The policy console is the user interface where you create and manage policies. The 
policy definitions specify, in a generalized form, a set of networking services along 
with the criteria used to regulate the provisioning of and access to those services. 
• The policy server stores policies authored in the console as well as status and other 
information provided by agents. It maintains the full system view of all computing 
systems, devices, resources, and policies. 
Every policy server contains a policy decision point (PDP) component that evaluates 
policies, their rules, and their targets in order to render policy decisions to any agent 
that is outsourcing its decision making to the server. 
Each primary policy server includes a policy database, or repository. The 
proprietary-format database is a structured binary file, or set of files, used to store 
policy, deployment, and status information. 
• The policy agents are used to deploy policies to their target resources. The agent 
informs the primary server about the status of policy deployments and the 
configuration states of the devices supported by that agent. 
As shown in Figure 4.13 configuration agent and outsourcing PEP run in the 
managed device. Communication between the policy console, the policy server, and 
the agent uses the Common Open Policy Service (COPS) standard. 
It is supported to define a single policy and deploy it to heterogeneous devices 
throughout the network, across multiple kinds of elements from multiple vendors. 
Any managed object supporting one or more of the Quality of Service methods 
(Class of Service, Bandwidth, RSVP) can be integrated with PolicyXpert, then 
managed using defined policies. 
 
 
 
 77 
 
Figure 4.13 PolicyXpert architecture. 
 
4.4.2 Policy Enforcement Points 
Policy agents are the integration point between PolicyXpert and managed elements 
(hardware or software). A policy agent converts policy information to device 
configuration and commands. The agents enforce the specific behaviors that a 
resource must provide according to the policy definitions. Agents also provide 
information to the policy server and console about policy-manageable elements [60]. 
There are two kinds of policy agents in PolicyXpert [60]: 
 Policy Enforcement Point: A Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) is an agent that 
operates within a managed device and outsources the policy decision making 
process to the policy server. It only implements, or enforces, the policy 
decisions made by the server. A PEP translates the policy decision into the 
device specific actions to carry out the decision. Currently, COPS-RSVP 
enforcement points are the only type of PEP supported by PolicyXpert [62].  
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 Policy Configuration Agent: A policy configuration agent receives 
generalized policy definitions from a policy server and translates the policy 
information into device-specific configuration and/or commands. In essence, 
a policy configuration agent performs both the decision making and 
enforcement processes associated with a policy. The configuration agent 
provides information to the policy server about what policy-manageable 
elements exist on the managed device or system, and what types of policies 
the agent and/or device can support.  
A policy configuration agent may reside directly on the managed device or system, 
or it may reside on some other system. If the configuration agent does not reside 
directly on the managed device, it is often referred to as a proxy configuration agent. 
Whether the policy configuration agent is embedded in the managed device or is a 
proxy agent, it communicates with the PolicyXpert server using the General Policy 
Interface (GPI) API/library [60]. 
The configuration agent uses the policy information obtained via the GPI to generate 
and/or update the appropriate device configurations for the resources that it supports. 
Agent-specific modules translate the policy information into the appropriate device-
specific configurations. In addition, these agent-specific modules perform the actual 
provisioning of the devices being managed. The configuration operations are done 
using whatever protocols and/or mechanisms are available for the specific type of 
device. Common protocols to configure devices via proxy include telnet/CLI, tftp 
and SNMP. 
4.5 IPHIGHWAY 
The IPHighway Open Policy System (OPS) [61] shown in Figure 4.14 uses 
centralized management architecture with distributed execution. OPS has one Policy 
Administrator that manages the distributed policy servers (PDPs) and multiple Policy 
Servers. 
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Figure 4.14 Open Policy System (OPS) 
 
4.5.1 OPS System Architecture 
The components that make up the Open Policy System are: 
 Policy Administrator: Central manager of the distributed policy servers 
 Policy Console: User/Administrator GUI for the Policy Administrator 
 Policy Server: Real-time, distributed servers controlling policy decision 
 Policy Gateway (QoSMaster): LAN/WAN (Wide Area Network) policy 
coordinator. QoSMaster provides congestion management and policy-based 
network control for timesensitive applications, important users, and other 
services typically of interest to enterprise network operators. 
 Policy Client/Proxy: Software for adding policy control capabilities to PEPs 
Policy Administrator can distribute policies to multiple Policy Servers, and correlate 
system feedback from those servers for monitoring and accounting purposes. 
Multiple policy servers may receive a policy rule if it is to be applied at several 
locations in the network. The support for multiple Policy Servers, the automatic 
recognition of new servers, and the automatic distribution of policy throughout the 
network are features of OPS that afford it the capability to scale to virtually any size 
network. 
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The Policy Servers can automatically discover network devices that may be 
controlled by the policy system, and reports them to the Policy Administrator when 
initializing. Once discovered, the devices are assigned to one of the OPS Policy 
Servers in the system. Network devices may also be manually entered into the 
system, and assigned to a Policy Server. 
4.5.1.1 OPS Policy Enforcement Point 
The Policy Server directly interacts with network devices, and acts as the Policy 
Decision Point (PDP), providing policy control for multiple network devices such as 
routers, switches, VPN devices, firewalls, and other Policy Enforcement Points 
(PEP). When a Policy Server is activated in the OPS-controlled network, the Policy 
Administrator to which it is assigned automatically recognizes it, and distributes the 
appropriate policy rules to it. 
The Policy Server converts policy rules received from the Policy Administrator into 
a form that can be understood by the devices it controls. That form may be device 
specific, such as CLI commands for a Cisco router; it may also be a standards-based 
protocol message, such as COPS. The Policy Server gathers status information from 
the devices it controls, and uses this feedback when making policy decisions related 
to the allocation of network resources and the assignment of those resources. The 
feedback is passed up to the Policy Administrator, ensuring that a complete and 
consistent view of the network is maintained. 
IPHighway‟s Policy Client controls virtually any device that is capable of enforcing 
QoS policy rules, allowing the device to participate in policy-based networking. 
When integrated into a network device, the Policy Client provides the device with an 
interface to the OPS Policy Server, allowing the device to be managed by the policy 
based management system. The current version of Policy Client is based on the 
Common Open Policy Service (COPS) IETF standards track protocols, developed in 
the RAP working group. 
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5 POLICE POLICY ENFORCEMENT POINT 
Police Policy Enforcement Point is the system that is responsible for the enforcement 
of the policies compiled by POLICE Policy Management System. POLICE provides 
a management console to system administrator to write his policies and compiles 
these policies. It has a Domain Service to store the policies and domain information. 
POLICE Policy Server deploys the policies to PPEPs and PPEP performs a set of 
operations to apply these policies to the managed objects that it controls. The 
detailed description of POLICE system is given in Chapter 3. 
In this section POLICE Policy Enforcement Point architecture, inside modules and 
operation are described. Also a brief comparison section is included. Comparison is 
done between the policy enforcement point architectures of Police, Active PBM, 
Ponder, Script MIB, HP OpenView PolicyXpert and IP Highway OPS. These 
systems were studied in Chapter 4. 
5.1 General Architecture of PPEP 
Police Policy Enforcement Point runs within a network device and takes the 
responsibility of applying the policies sent by the Policy Server and sending 
information about managed device to Policy Server.  
The enforcement of both obligation policies and authorization policies are done by 
Policy Controller in Police Policy Enforcement system. PEP receives the policy 
objects from Policy Deployment Service via PDS Agent and Messaging Service 
(JMS) and Policy Controller enforces these policies after an interaction with Event 
Service and Resource Controller. Policy Controller applies the obligation policies 
directly when the constraints are proved but does not apply the authorization policies 
unless a request comes from the managed nodes via Resource Controller. Policy 
Controller sends the policies to managed objects via Managed Node Interface.  
Components of PPEP of which the general architecture is shown in Figure 5.1 are as 
follows: 
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 Policy Controller 
 Policy Deployment Service Agent 
 Event Service 
 DataBase 
 Resource Controller 
 Node Management Interface 
 Messaging Service 
 PPEP Manager  
PEP components and concepts used in PEP are defined in the next sections. 
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JMS
Client
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Resource Controller
Managed Node Interface
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O2
DB
PPEP Manager
 
Figure 5.1 POLICE Management System Policy Enforcement Architecture 
5.2 PPEP Manager 
PPEP manager takes place at the startup of the PPEP. It scans the DataBase tables to 
initialize the policies and registers to Domain Server. 
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PPEP firstly directs the CIMOM to get the information about the managed objects 
and system events from the managed device and sends this information to Domain 
Server.  
PPEP Manager reads all policies at the policy table and sends them to Policy 
Controller in order to notify the Event Service and makes it possible to apply the 
policies again, just like receiving them from the Policy Deployment Service.   
5.3 Policy Controller 
Policy Controller (PC) is the unit which is responsible for applying the policies to the 
related managed objects in the enforcement point. PC receives the policies from the 
Policy Deployment Service and stores them in the DataBase in policy table. PC 
sends the “when constraints” to Event Service and waits for Policy Gauge‟s result to 
apply the policy.  
PC stores both obligation and authorization policies in the same table and applies 
every obligation policy to the managed objects when the constraint is proved, for 
authorization policies PC only changes the state value of the constraint in the policy 
table when received the result from PG and replies the authorization requests coming 
from managed nodes via Resource Controller. 
5.3.1 Policy Controller Components 
5.3.1.1 Policy DataBase 
Policy Controller Policy DB is a table in which the Policies received from PDS are 
stored. Policy DB table fields are:  
  “policy name” the primary key field of the table identifies policies and 
includes the domain path, 
 “type” shows the type of the policy; it can take two values, 
o obligation policy 
o authorization policy 
 “actor” the object that will process the “action”,  
 “target” the object that the action will be processed on,  
 “action” the action to be taken when the condition policy is proved,  
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 “condition state” the flag that shows if the condition is proved or not.  
The structure of this table is shown in Table 5.1. Default value for the state field is 
(X) meaning that the constraint is not yet proved. After the Event Service returns the 
prove value this state turns to be (√ ). 
Table 5.1 Policy DB 
Policy Name Type Actor Target Action Condition State 
Domain\Policy OBL O1 O5 Method1 X 
     X 
  . 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
 
Policy DB is searched by PolicyName value. PolicyName is unique for every policy 
and it includes the domain path that the policy implemented. The ConditionState 
field value is changed by Event Service – Policy Gauge process results.  
5.3.1.2 Process Policy Module 
Process policy module receives the policies from PDS Agent with a parameter telling 
the action to be taken with that policy. It performs three kinds of actions: 
ADD_POLICY: Inserts the policy to PolicyTable and checks the policy constraint, if 
the constraint is an ABSOLUTE constraint there is no need to send the constraint to 
Event Service else the constraint structure is sent to Event Service with PolicyName 
parameter as an identifier. Absolute constraints can have two different types: Never 
or Always. If the policy has a never constraint that means this action is prohibited 
else if it is always constraint that means this policy will be applied without any 
checks. 
DELETE_POLICY: Removes the policy entry from the PolicyTable and from Event 
Service DB tables and the policy gauge module and the consumer threads are 
stopped. 
UPDATE_POLICY: Removes the policy entry from the PolicyTable and from Event 
Service DB tables and add the policy just as a new one.  
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5.3.1.3 Apply Policy Module 
Apply policy module is triggered by Policy Gauge modules. Event Service creates a 
policy gauge for each policy entry and policy gauge checks the constraint state value 
of the related policy in a loop while the policy is in the Policy DB. Policy gauge 
triggers the policy controller in two states: 
 DOWN: The constraint value changes from „1‟ to „0‟ 
 UP: The constraint value changes from „0‟ to „1‟ 
Apply policy module performs different actions according to the UP/DOWN 
parameter. For example if the policy is as follows 
inst mustdo filterIP { 
  actor   a = /Router/router1/routingDeamon; 
  target  /Router/router1/eth0; 
  action  down(port); 
  when  throughput>50Mbit; 
If the throughput > 50 Mbit policy gauge informs the PC with UP parameter and PC 
forces the managed object to close eth0 port. When the throughput value decreases 
policy gauge knows this and informs the PC again but this time with DOWN 
parameter and PC forces the managed object to open the port. 
If the constraint value of the policy is an ABSOLUTE constraint than the ES doesn‟t 
process this constraint and doesn‟t create policy gauge for this policy, in this 
situation process policy module itself calls the apply policy module and the value of 
this policy‟s constraint state doesn‟t change until this policy updated. 
5.3.2 Operation of Policy Controller 
PDS agent on PPEP receives the policies from the Policy Deployment Service of the 
Management System via JMS and decides if the received message includes a new 
policy to insert, or an old policy to delete or update. PDS sends the policy to PC with 
an action parameter. According to the action parameter which shows what to do with 
this policy, PC either writes the policy to Policy DB or deletes it from the Policy DB 
or updates the policy entry in the policy DB.  
For all policies which have a condition having a type except for 
ABSOLUTE_CONSTRAINT, PC sends a request to Event Service in order to be 
notified when the condition is set. Event Service writes these constraints in 
ConditionTable and registers to CIMOM Event Trigger for the events in the 
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constraint, and creates a Policy Gauge for each policy. Policy Gauge creates event 
consumer thread and notifies the policy controller in every action of the state value. 
When PC receives the notification it writes (√) or (X) to the “condition state” and 
applies the policy.  
     Policy Deployment Service Agent
PC PC
Event Service
JMS
Resource Controller
Managed Node Interface
O1
O4
O3
O2
     Policy Deployment Service Agent
PC PC
Event Service
JMS
Resource Controller
Managed Node Interface
O1
O4
O3
O2
1
2
4
6 7
8
5 9
3
10
1
1
PEP_1 PEP_2
 
Figure 5.2 Enforcement of an obligation policy 
Figure 5.2 shows the policy enforcement of an obligation policy specified as: 
mustdo policyOBL { 
   actor  :  O1 ; 
   target :  O3; 
   action :  O3.Action1; 
   when :  O7.Event1 && O4.Event2; 
} 
PEP_1 receives the policy from Policy Server (1) via PDS agent and sends it to PC 
(2), PC processes the policy and sends the constraint object to ES if needed (3), ES 
sends Inter Node Event Messages to remote PPEPs if there is a remote related event 
(4). Both the local (5) and remote (6) PPEPs wait for the event to occur in their 
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systems and when the remote one receives the event (7) it sends a reply message to 
local PPEP (8). The local PPEP also receives and processes the local events (9) and 
triggers the PC (10), PC applies the obligation policy (11).  
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Figure 5.3 Enforcement of an authorization policy 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the policy enforcement of an authorization policy specified as 
cando policyAUTH { 
   actor  :  O1 ; 
   target :  O3; 
   action :  O3.Action1; 
   when  :  O7.Event1 & O4.Event2; 
} 
PC stores the authorization policies in the policy table and updates the state values 
when the constraint value changes. When RC receives an authorization request from 
a managed object (1), it redirects it to the related PC (2) and PC searches it at the 
policy table. PC sends the reply (3) according to the policy search to RC and RC 
informs the managed node (4). 
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For a better performance, policy objects can have another field to specify policy 
type: 
 Continuous: when the “condition state” turns to (√) a method is called; when 
it turns to (X) another method is called; and this continuous until the policy is 
unloaded or deleted.  
 Once: PC waits for the Event Service for “condition state” to turn to (√) and 
calls the related method then PC deletes the Policy Record from Event 
Service DB and from its own DB.  
But these two types of policies are not yet implemented. 
5.4 Event Service 
The Event Service collects and composes events from the managed nodes and from 
remote Event Services of other PPEPs, and forwards them to the registered PCs 
which are executing policies. The ES is an integrated service spread through the 
distributed system nodes via the Inter-Node Event Bus. Event Service has following 
modules: 
 Condition Table: The constraints received from PCs and their state values are 
stored in condition table. 
 Policy Gauge: Watches the state value of the constraints on condition table, 
and triggers PC. 
 Event Service Manager: Receives the constraints from PCs and processes 
them. 
 Inter-Node Event Collector: Used for communication with remote ESs. 
5.4.1 Operation of Event Service 
The block diagram showing the interaction of an ES with other Police PEP modules 
is shown in Figure 5.4. The Event Service is in interaction with Policy Controller, 
JMS client and Node Management Interface. 
Policy Controller registers one constraint to Event Service for each obligation and 
authorization policy of which the constraint type is not an ABSOLUTE Constraint. 
When a constraint is received, ES parses it and divides it into separate events, inserts 
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a record to the Condition Table and creates a Policy Gauge for each. Policy Gauge 
evaluates the constraint state, updates the Condition Table and triggers PC for every 
change in the value of the state of the constraint. The events can belong to local 
managed objects or to a remote PPEP‟s managed objects.  
Policy Gauge creates Event Consumers (ECs) for the constraint and each Event 
Consumer watches an event or a pseudo event or a value of composite events. The 
pseudo-events in the constraint section of a policy are created to observe attributes of 
the managed system‟s objects and occur when these attributes reach at specified 
value ranges. 
For the local ones event ECs register to Event Trigger in NMI and NMI triggers EC 
when the event occurs. For remote ones, EC registers to Inter Node Event Collector 
and Inter Node Event Collector sends a message to the remote PPEP via Inter node 
Event Bus and triggers the EC when an event occurred message is received. For local 
pseudo events, EC polls the CIMOM periodically. If the pseudo event belongs to a 
remote node EC registers to Inter Node Event Collector and Inter Node Event 
Collector holds a table, and writes every value of the needed property to this table as 
it receives messages from remote. ECs poll this table for pseudo events just like 
polling CIMOM.  
When a PPEP receives an Event Message from a remote PPEP, it creates a Remote 
Poller for pseudo events and this module polls the CIMOM periodically and sends a 
reply message to remote for each value. For events it directly registers to Event 
Trigger in NMI and sends a reply message when it is triggered by NMI for the event 
occurrence.  
Unlike other policy specification languages, Police uses event-triggers for both 
authorization and obligation policies. This makes it possible to change access rights 
according to the system events as well. Another superiority that this design provides 
is homogenous enforcement for all types of policies.  
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Figure 5.4 Block Diagram of ES in Police PEP 
 
5.4.2 Condition Table 
Condition table is used to store the constraint value of each policy and its current 
state value. The structure of the condition table is shown in Table 5.2. Fields of the 
table are: 
 “policy name” the name of the related policy, unique for each policy 
 “condition” the object that keeps the constraint value of the policy  
 “state” the value that shows if the constraint is proved or not 
The primary key of the table is “policy name” field. 
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Table 5.2 Condition Table 
Policy Name Condition State 
PolicyA Event1&&Event4 X 
PolicyB Event2||Event3 X 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
The event processor unit inserts one entry to the condition table on each time it 
receives a policy from policy controller and it deletes the related entry when received 
a delete message from PC. Policy gauge updates the condition table when it finds out 
that the constraint is proved. PG decides this after communicating with NMI or 
remote PPEPs.  
5.4.3 Policy Gauge 
Policy Gauge is the module which watches the policy constraint‟s state value and 
informs the Policy Controller when the state value changes.  
After a PC receives a policy from the PDS, it parses the policy and decides if the 
policy constraint needs to be registered to Event Service or not. There are 8 types of 
constraints, these are:  
 COMPOSITE_CONSTRAINT 
 TIME_CONSTRAINT 
 SUBJECT_CONSTRAINT 
 TARGET_CONSTRAINT 
 ACTION_CONSTRAINT 
 EVENT_CONSTRAINT 
 SYSTEM_CONSTRAINT 
 ABSOLUTE_CONSTRAINT 
There is no need to register to ES for an ABSOLUTE_CONSTRAINT type 
constraint, because this type of constraint has two options NEVER, ALWAYS. For 
the other types of constraints PC registers to Event Service and Event Service 
Manager creates one Policy Gauge for each policy constraint it receives from PC. 
This Policy Gauge stays alive while the policy entry is in Policy Controller Policy 
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Table. This PG evaluates the constraint state continuously while the policy is not 
deleted.  
Each policy gauge module works on one policy constraint. This constraint can 
contain multiple events and multiple logical relations. The constraint object is parsed 
into its events and pseudo events in Policy Gauge and each event forms an Event 
Consumer. Event Consumers construct a hierarchic structure described in 5.4.3.2 
under Policy Gauge and the Event Consumer at the highest level notifies the PG of 
changed in the state value.  
The constraint sections of the Police policies are implemented as event-statements 
composed of system-events and pseudo-events. In order to express event statements, 
complicated event expressions can be written by the help of Policy Definition 
Language (PDL) [16], defining several operators to derive complex events from 
primitive events.  
The pseudo-events are created to observe attributes of the managed system‟s objects 
and occur when a specified value range of these attributes are reached. Also, the 
sophisticated time period conditions can be implemented as pseudo-events. For 
example, the statements like “object1.attribute2 > 200”, “Date > 10.12.2003” are 
considered as pseudo-events. The pseudo-events compose complex event statements 
with the system events in the constraint section of the policies. The constraint part of 
our policy specification syntax can include such statements as below: 
 when   (event1 && event2) ||  ( Object5.attribute4 =12) || (Date > 10.12.2003) 
 when  event1 && ( Object5.attribute3 > 200) AND ^event2 
 when  (Object15.attribute1 >= Constant.SUSPEND) || event1
3
 
When the “state” value changes, the PG triggers the related PC. So, there is no need 
the PC to evaluate its policies whether the conditions are met to execute them, as the 
ES performs this task for PCs.  
A policy gauge output example is given in Figure 5.5. PG triggers the PC at t0, t1, 
t2, t3. PC performs different actions for the DOWN and UP sides of the gauge 
output. According to this figure, within the time intervals of [t0-t1] and [t2-t3], 
policy gauge is active. PC stores the gauge outputs in its own policy table.  
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While a gauge is active, if related policy is an authorization policy, the actors can 
perform actions if they attempt, otherwise nothing will happen. In case of the 
obligation policy, the activation of the gauge causes the PC to enforce the actors of 
the policy to do actions of the policy and deactivation of gauges stop the actors. 
When triggering the PC, Policy Gauge also sends information about UP or DOWN 
side. 
 
Figure 5.5 A sample Policy Gauge output  
5.4.3.1 Policy Gauge Evaluation Method 
A Policy Gauge creates a tree of event consumer objects which corresponds to the 
runtime event specification created by the compiler. Each of the event consumers is 
responsible for a node of the event tree. Event consumers appearing as leaf nodes in 
the tree correspond to single events and are responsible for registering to Event 
Trigger of CIMOM or Inter Node Event Collector (INEC) and are responsible for 
polling CIMOM or INEC as described in 5.4.3.2, to receive notification for those 
events.  
Composite event consumers are responsible for enforcing the semantics of the event 
operator they are representing.  
The composite consumer for the  operator will only send a notification to the next 
level if it receives a notification for event at the left side of the operator before the 
event at the right side.  
The composite consumer for the && (AND) operator will notify the upper side 
consumer after it receives a notification from both the left and right side events of the 
operator. 
Similarly, the composite consumer for the || (OR) operator will notify the upper side 
consumer after it receives a notification from either the left or right side events of the 
operator. 
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5.4.3.2 Event Consumers 
Event Consumers Tree is a part of the Policy Gauge which evaluates the whole 
constraint and notifies the Policy Gauge when the result changes. Event Consumers 
are created recursively in a hierarchic structure from top to bottom. They evaluate the 
constraint recursively from bottom to top. This structure is shown in Figure 5.6 for 
the constraint: 
((Event_1 AND PseudoEvent_1) OR ((Event_2 AND PseudoEvent_2) OR Event_3)) 
Firstly the constraint is divided into two parts at the first level and the operator 
between them is placed at the top “OR”: 
1- ((Event_1 AND PseudoEvent_1)  
2- ((((Event_2 AND PseudoEvent_2) OR Event_3) 
Then these two parts are divided into their events and their operators are placed in 
their positions and second level is constructed: 
1.1- Event_1 
1.2- PseudoEvent_1 
2.1- (Event_2 AND PseudoEvent_2) 
2.2- Event_3 
2.1 is still a composite constraint so it should be divided once more, this is the third 
and the last level: 
2.1.1  Event_2 
2.1.2  PseudoEvent_2 
The consumers which do not have a sub-consumer starts working to learn their 
event‟s or pseudo event‟s values from Local CIMOM or Remote CIMOM.  
The Pseudo Event Consumers firstly decides if the pseudo event is local or remote. If 
it is local consumer polls the CIMOM periodically, else consumer registers to Inter 
Node Event Collector and polls it. 
The Event Consumers firstly decides if the event is local or remote. If it is local 
consumer registers to Event Trigger in CIMOM and waits for being triggered, else 
consumer registers to Inter Node Event Collector and waits trigger from there. 
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Figure 5.6 Event Consumers schema for constraint: 
((Event_1 AND PseudoEvent_1) OR ((Event_2 AND PseudoEvent_2) OR Event_3)) 
5.4.4 Event Service Manager 
Event Service Manager is the main of ES that organizes every other modules 
operation. It interacts with Police Controller and Condition Table and creates the 
Policy Gauges as shown in Figure 5.4. 
Policy Controller registers one constraint to Event Service Manager for each 
obligation and authorization policy of which the constraint type is not an 
ABSOLUTE Constraint. When a constraint is received, ESP inserts a record to the 
Condition Table and creates a Policy Gauge for it. Then the responsibility of 
triggering PC is Policy Gauge‟s told in 5.4.3. 
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5.4.5 Inter-Node Event Collector 
Inter-Node Event Collector interacts with the other Event Services over the Inter-
Node Event Bus. Inter-Node Event Bus carries the messages by JMS using a JMS 
Server. POLICE management system has a JMS Server for events and every PPEP 
has a JMS client. These clients send messages to collect data from the other ESs and 
also send the events they collected from their own nodes in order to inform other 
ESs. 
The message formats are shown in Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8.  
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Figure 5.7 Request Message 
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Figure 5.8 Reply Message 
Inter Node Event collector operates as shown in Figure 5.9. Event Consumers can 
handle 4 different types of events:  
 Local events 
 Local pseudo events 
 Remote events  
 Remote pseudo events  
For remote events and remote pseudo events, ES has to communicate with the 
remote PEPP‟s ES. Event Consumer registers to INEC for these events and waits for 
being triggered for remote events, but polls INEC for remote pseudo events, because 
INEC holds the received values of remote in a table in it. The aim of this approach is 
not to change the general working principal of ECs. Just as polling local pseudo 
events from CIMOM, it can poll remote ones from INEC.  
If INEC receives a request message from another PPEP‟s INEC, it just registers to 
CIMOM – Event Trigger module for “events” and when CIMOM triggers it, it sends 
a reply message to remote in order to trigger remote. If the received message 
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includes a pseudo event INEC creates a Remote Poller thread to poll CIMOM for 
this property and sends periodic messages to remote to notify about this value. 
Inter Node Event Collector operation steps shown in Figure 5.9 are explained below. 
These steps start at the point where PC sends the constraints to ES and ES creates 
Policy Gauges and Event Consumers. The constraint of PG1 includes two pseudo 
events (1 local, 1 remote) and one local event, PG2 includes two events (1 local, 1 
remote). 
 Step1: PG1 consumers start polling CIMOM for local pseudo event and 
receive the values periodically. 
 Step2: PG1 consumers register to local CIMOM Event Trigger for local 
event. 
 Step3: PG1 is triggered by CIMOM Event Trigger when the related event 
occurs. 
 Step4: PG1 consumers register to INEC for remote pseudo event and start 
polling INEC.   
 Step5: INEC sends a request message (of which the format is shown in 
Figure 5.7) to remote INEC for the need in step 5 and creates a register for 
this value to let the Event Consumer polling. 
 Step6: Remote INEC receives the message sent in step 5 and creates a 
Remote Poller thread to poll the CIMOM. 
 Step7: Remote Poller starts polling CIMOM. 
 Step8: Remote Poller notifies remote INEC about the value it polls 
periodically. 
 Step9: Remote INEC sends reply messages periodically to inform PPEP 1 
INEC. 
 Step10: PG2 Event Consumers register to INEC for remote event. 
 Step11: INEC sends a request message to remote. 
 Step12: Remote receives the message sent at step 11 and registers to its 
CIMOM Event Trigger. 
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 Step13: Remote CIMOM triggers the remote INEC when the event occurs. 
 Step14: Remote INEC sends a reply message when it is triggered by CIMOM 
Event Trigger. 
 Step15: PPEP 1 INEC triggers the related Event Consumer when it receives 
the reply message sent in step 14. 
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Figure 5.9  Inter Node Event Collector messaging via Inter Node Event Bus 
 
5.4.5.1 Remote Poller 
Remote Poller is the module which polls a single pseudo event‟s value requested by 
a remote PPEP. It notifies the INEC every time it receives a different value from 
CIMOM. It polls the CIMOM periodically. 
Event Service creates one Remote Poller thread for each request message coming 
from remote for pseudo events. 
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Creating an event consumer at remote PPEP can be an alternative solution. At this 
solution, ES sends the whole event consumer to the remote PPEP for remote 
attributes and the PPEP receiving the message creates a thread for each consumer 
request and evaluates its value. Remote PPEP sends the value of this consumer to the 
requesting PPEP when its value changes.  
The advantage of the first solution shows itself when multiple ECs watch the value 
of the same attribute. Otherwise the second solution seems to have better 
performance.  
5.5 Resource Controller 
Resource Controller is the unit which acts as an interface between the PC and the 
managed objects for the authorization policies.  
Normally, each actor is in a scope of one PC, which enforces all policies defined for 
that actor object. A PC controls all the actors at its location and enforces all policies 
relating to its actors. Being primarily a stationary agent, each PC normally enforces 
many policies and controls the behaviors of many different actors in the domain for 
which this PC is responsible. 
In the PEP architecture, the Resource Controller intercepts all access requests of the 
actors and redirects them to concerned PC to check whether the access is permitted. 
The block diagram showing the interactions of RC with other system units is in 
Figure 5.10. When an object attempts to execute an operation on another object, first 
it should have the permission to perform this action. Authorization policies are stored 
in Policy Controller Policy Table.  
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Figure 5.10 Block diagram of Resource Controller 
5.5.1 Controller Table 
Controller table is used to store the relations between the Policy Controllers and 
target objects. Each entry in the table shows the PC that controls the managed object 
named “object”. The structure of the controller table is shown in Table 5.3. Fields of 
the table are: 
 “object” the name of the target object  
 “policy controller” the id of the PC that controls the target.  
The primary key of the table is “target” field. 
Table 5.3 Controller Table 
Object Policy controller 
TargetOBJ1 PC_1 
TargetOBJ2 PC_2 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
 
5.5.2 Operation of Resource Controller 
When a managed object wants to perform an action on another managed object, first 
it has to get permission for this from the Policy controller. The managed object 
communicates with the Resource Controller over the Node Management Interface 
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and queries the RC via a message containing the target object and the action to be 
performed. This operation is shown in Figure 5.3. 
RC searches the target on the Controller Table and finds out the related PC. Then the 
RC sends a request to that PC containing Actor (the object that sent the request to 
RC), Target and Action. When PC receives this request it searches the related policy 
in the Policy Table, and returns the “State” value to RC. RC informs the actor node 
about the result. If the requested action is authorized the object can execute the action 
else it cannot. 
5.6 Policy Deployment Service Agent 
Policy Deployment Service Agent receives the policy objects sent by Policy 
Deployment Service via JMS Server, and sends them to the related Policy Controller. 
PDS agent on PPEP has an interface to JMS Server on the Management Center. It 
receives the policies sent by the Server via Messaging Service and processes these 
messages according to the Message Type. There are three types of messages: 
 ADD_POLICY 
 UPDATE_POLICY 
 DELETE_POLICY 
PDS Agents search the Resource Controller Table to find out the PC to which the 
policy will be sent. RC Table is searched by the object field (primary key of the 
table) with actor name in the policy. PDS agent then sends the policy structure to 
Policy Controller with a parameter to specify what to do with the policy; add, delete 
or update. After receiving a message PDS Agent sends an acknowledgment message 
to the Server. Figure 5.11 shows the flow diagram of PDS Agent on PPEP.  
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Figure 5.11 Flow diagram of PDS Agent on PPEP 
5.7 Node Management Interface 
The Police Node Management Interface provides a standard interface between the 
Police PEP and the embedded hardware and software. In this way, the management 
activities are executed on representatives of the real managed objects and thus a 
uniform access on object interfaces during execution of policies is possible. When 
accessing the modules‟ interfaces through the mediation layer to perform operations 
specified in the action list, the method calls are transformed into a series of system 
specific function calls on the actual managed object. 
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Figure 5.12 CIM Instrumentation of a Managed Node. 
 
In order to implement a flexible node management interface that allows the Police 
PEPs to enforce policies in an independent way of the underlying implementation of 
the managed system, Common Information Model Object Manager (CIMOM) based 
approach defined in the Web-Based Enterprise Management (WBEM) technologies 
of the DMTF [63] is used in architecture.  
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5.7.1 Operation of NMI 
In each NMI, a CIMOM is employed to serve the requests of Police PEP for the data 
about the managed objects. The NMI includes a standard and a product-specific 
element schema loaded into the CIMOM repository. The NMI includes also native 
provider interface to communicate with the managed node via native providers such 
as SNMP, CMIP, JMX providers.  
WBEM uses a client server model as shown in Figure 5.12. Policy Controllers, 
Resource Controller and Event Service act as a WBEM Client and send the messages 
to CIMOM via HTTP/XML Mapping Module. This module converts the messages 
coming from PCs, ES or RC to a format that the CIMOM can understand and 
converts the messages of CIMOM in a format that is suitable to send via HTTP.  
PC sends policy apply requests to CIMOM, RC gets the authorization requests from 
the managed objects and replies them, and ES asks some values of managed objects 
and receives the events that occurs. 
CIMOM receives the requests coming from these clients and firstly looks at the 
CIMOM Repository for static information such as schema definitions or static 
instances, if it cannot find the information it needs then forwards the request to the 
provider. CIMOM knows which provider is responsible for which managed object 
from the element schemas.  
Consumers waiting for an event registers to Event Trigger in CIMOM. Event Trigger 
holds a list of events for which the consumers registered and the consumers that are 
registered for each event. Event Trigger receives the events from providers and 
notifies the consumers registered to it. 
Providers communicate with the managed nodes, collect any data from these nodes. 
In Police PEP, providers are also responsible for enforcing the actions in the policies 
to the managed objects and detecting and forwarding events to the management 
application via CIMOM. 
If the data received from the managed object is in a native format, provider maps it to 
CIM classes before passing to CIMOM. In the same way if the managed node that 
CIMOM wants to learn requires data in native format, provider maps the CIM 
classes received from CIMOM to native format and then passes to the managed 
object. 
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CIMOM Repository stores the CIM class definitions and dynamic data. The 
definitions are converted from a text MOF file into CIM Repository formatted data. 
5.8 DataBase 
Police Policy Enforcement Point needs storage for the information of some relations 
between the inside components, the received policies, system events and the 
constraint objects of the policies. This storage is designed as a DB containing a table 
for each data class.  
There are 3 different tables to store: 
 Policy Controller – Actor relation 
 Policies to be applied 
 Constraint (condition) Objects that the Policy Controller waits for to apply a 
policy 
The implementation details of the DB and the tables are given in 6.2. 
5.9 Messaging Service 
In Police PBM framework PPEP communicates with Police Policy Deployment 
Service and also with other PPEPs via Inter Node Event Bus. It receives polices from 
PDS and sends state and registration information to PDS. PPEPs communicate with 
each other to request or reply event states. For these operations we chose a 
messaging system of which the implementation details are given in 6.1. 
5.10 Domain Server Registration 
Police Policy Server receives the policies from management console, compiles and 
stores them in Domain Service Policy Repository and sends them to Police PEPs. 
Domain Service also includes Domain Objects Repository. Domain Service stores 
the information about which Policy PEP is responsible of which managed objects. 
This information is needed when Police Server is about to send a policy to PPEP. 
After compiling a policy, Police Server queries the Domain Service to with the 
Policy/Actor parameter and learns the PPEP that is responsible for this Actor.  
Domain Service can get this information in two ways: 
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 Manually : Police Server administrator can put this information to server            
manually via server console. 
 Automatically :  PPEP registers itself to server on startup. 
On startup, PPEP sends the information of the managed objects that it is responsible 
for to Police Server via Inter Node Deployment and Communication Bus. This 
information includes the names of the Managed Objects and the events that can occur 
in the managed system. 
5.11 Comparison with Other Management Systems’ PEPs  
In this section some properties of Police PEP is compared with the same properties 
of the PEPs of the frameworks studied in Chapter 4. The list of all compared 
properties is given in A.1. Some fields of this table are explained more detailed in the 
following paragraphs.  
Police Policy Enforcement Points communicate with each other via Inter Node Event 
Bus. This communication aims to collect data and event from remote nodes. PPEP 
can learn a property of a remote managed node or can be triggered when a specific 
event occurs at a remote node. Except for Police, this kind of a communication is 
supported by only Active PBM. Active PBM PDPs communicate each other via PDP 
Inter-Domain capsules when a PDP has to take a decision related to an inter-domain 
connection. PEPs can only communicate with PDPs, Active PBM uses either PEP 
capsules or PDP capsules for this communication. 
Unlike other systems Police and Ponder store the policies at a local policy table at the 
PEP. Other systems store their policies at PDP. Using PDP for all device policies 
may hold the PDPs busy, in a distributed system it is preferable to distribute policies 
too, although some say it is better to keep PEP simpler. Another advantage of local 
storage shows itself in “cando” (authorization) policies, when managed device wants 
to get authorization it doesn‟t need to ask to PDP which a remote stand alone unit but 
it just asks to PEP agent.  
Police PEP supports event triggering for both obligation and authorization policies 
while Ponder only supports obligation for policies. This makes it possible to change 
access rights according to the system events as well. Active PBM also works over 
event triggering method and stores the events in PDP, this may cause network to be 
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busier. Other systems do not use event triggering. Active PBM sends every event to 
PDP and executes for every kind of policy. In Ponder events trigger the Event 
Publisher at the management center. In Police events trigger the Event Services in 
the PEPs. 
Police PEPs register to Policy Server on startup and IpHighway OPS PEP is 
discovered by Policy Server, but other systems do not support such a property.  
None of the PBM systems that we studied include a security module. When we look 
at the academic products, only in Script MIB security module is applicable. HP 
OpenView and IpHighway do not implemented security module, too. SNMP security 
based on SNMPv3 and the user based security model and on the view based access 
control model is fully applicable to the Script MIB. Police uses JMS for 
communication between distributed units and JMS, itself has a security module so it 
is also applicable to Police. 
The superiority of our enforcement architecture is catching prohibited actions at the 
source, before these actions consume some system resources. In Ponder, for example, 
actions are checked at target-side to determine whether the actors are allowed to 
perform them. In contrast, the Police philosophy is to assign a policeman for each 
actor in the system, not to set up defense lines around the resources against any actor. 
We control the actions at their sources before they are started. 
Both obligation and authorization policies are distributed in the same uniform way to 
the PCs near the actors that it makes our architecture simpler. 
Police architecture is suitable to create multiple PCs for different types of policies or 
targets etc. This can help e.g. to separate obligation and authorization policy 
controllers and run these two paralleled.  
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6 IMPLEMENTATION OF PPEP 
In order to show the feasibility of an effective policy enforcement system based on 
the idea presented in this thesis, a prototype implementation has been developed to 
work inter operable with Police PBM framework.  
The node management interface is simulated but the other modules are mostly 
implemented. Another part of the simulation is managed node. Police PEP cannot 
work with a real network device yet. 
For simplicity only one Policy Controller is created in this prototype, in the next 
versions multi PC should be implemented and tested. It needs measuring in order to 
see the advantages or disadvantages.  
The application is developed on Windows 2000 operating system with Borland 
JBuilder 9 compiler. Open JMS messaging service and MySQL database is used to 
provide a working environment to Police PEP. In this chapter, details of 
implementation and evaluation of PPEP according to this implementation is given. 
6.1 JMS  
Rather than communicating directly with each other, the components in an 
application based around a message service send messages to a message server. The 
message server, in turn, delivers the messages to the specified recipients [64].  
The common building block of a messaging service is the message. Messages are 
events, requests, and replies that are created by and delivered to enterprise 
applications. Messages contain formatted data with specific business meanings. 
Open JMS is used as messaging service in Police PBM system and Police PEP. The 
Java Message Service (JMS) API [64] products are the most scalable and mostly 
used messaging middleware solutions. Messaging systems provide a way to 
exchange data asynchronously and the JMS API allows a java application to connect 
to these systems. Once connected, an application can use the facilities of the 
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underlying enterprise messaging system to create messages and communicate 
asynchronously with one or more peer applications. Specific goals of the JMS API 
specification are to:  
 Provide a single, unified message API  
 Provide an API suitable for the creation of messages that match the format 
used by existing, non-JMS applications  
 Support the development of heterogeneous applications that span operating 
systems, platforms, architectures, and computer languages  
 Support messages that contain serialized Java objects  
 Support messages that contain XML pages  
6.2 DataBase 
We used MySQL open source database for database implementation of POLICE 
Policy Enforcement Point application and MyODBC 3.51 as ODBC Driver. Also 
MySQL Control Center is used to create our PPEP tables and observe debug tests.  
MySQL, a popular Open Source SQL database, is developed and provided by 
MySQL AB. MySQL AB is a commercial company that builds its business providing 
services around the MySQL database. 
MySQL Connector/ODBC (also known as MyODBC) allows connecting to a 
MySQL database server using the ODBC database API on all Microsoft Windows 
and most Unix platforms, including through such applications and programming 
environments such as Microsoft Access, Microsoft Excel, and Borland Delphi. 
6.2.1 Table Structures 
Tables used to store the Police PEP data structures are created via MySQL Control 
Center. Each PPEP connects to a DB having the same name with itself and uses the 
username password written in the configuration file to establish this connection. Also 
the tables could be created automatically at initialization of the PPEP once at the 
startup; we chose to create them manually for this demo version. The structures of 
the tables are given in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 with the primary key fields for each 
one. 
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Table 6.1 Policy Controller Policy Table 
policycontroller_policytable 
Policy Name Primary Key Varchar 
Type  Int 
Actor  Varchar 
Target  Varchar 
Action  Varchar 
Condition State  Int  
 
Table 6.2 Condition Table 
conditiontable 
Policy Name  Primary Key Varchar 
Condition  Blob 
State  Int 
 
6.3 Simulation of Managed Device and NMI 
PPEP runs just like an agent with each device to be managed by Police. Node 
Management Interface is the interface between managed device and PPEP. NMI 
provides flexibility to PPEP to work with any kind of network device. By the help of 
an appropriate NMI implementation PPEP can control every device.  
NMI applies the policies sent by Policy Controller, receives the events from managed 
system, receives any authorization request from managed nodes and replies to them 
after getting a result from Policy controller. It interacts with Policy Controller 
directly for applying obligation policies and via Resource Controller for 
authorization policies. 
In PPEP implementation, neither a specific network device used nor NMI 
implemented but both units are simulated in one Java class “Simulator”. Simulator 
provides the following to help us watching the general operation of PPEP: 
 Create events: Simulator gets the event names from the user as an input and 
sends it directly to Node Event Collector. 
 Event Trigger: When an event is created Simulator triggers the related PPEP 
modules (consumers). It provides an interface to PPEP to register when an 
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event is waited. Consumers register to Event Trigger for an event and when 
the event is created, Event Trigger triggers the registered consumers. 
 Apply obligation polices: When Policy Controller makes a decision to apply 
an obligation policy it triggers the Simulator about applying a policy and 
Simulator warns the user of the policy to be applied showing an information 
message.  
 Creates authorization request: Simulator can create an authorization request. 
User should give the actor node, target node and the action as input. 
Simulator sends this request to Resource Manager and waits for the reply. 
When received the reply it shows it to the user on an information message. 
6.4 Evaluation of PPEP 
To measure the time needed to load policies and process the system events a simple 
test environment is set. Server ran on a stand alone PC and one another PC runs two 
PPEPs.  
Tests a re performed deploying 100 policies and then creating 100 events on PPEPs. 
It is observed that, PPEP can process 45 policies in1 minute and 27 events in 1 
minute. 
Measurements depend on lots of parameter; these are CPU, RAM, DB Access, 
debugging information, logs, etc. Of course one important parameter is network 
performance. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
In this thesis we presented general approach to Policy Enforcement of Policy Based 
Networks, a Policy Enforcement Point “Police PEP” and made a research of some 
other PBM systems‟ PEPs.  
Police Policy Based Management system is studied and an enforcement point 
architecture is designed to work with Police, Police PEP.  
Active PMB, Ponder, Script MIB, HPOpenView and IPHihgway OPS are researched 
and the general architectures and policy enforcement mechanisms of these systems 
are studied and classified. Our PEP mechanism is compared with these systems.  
With Police all the managed objects in a distributed system are organized into 
hierarchical domains. Policies are then written in terms of domains. This means that 
there is normally no need to write policies specific to an object. Instead, whenever an 
object is added to a domain, the policies that apply to that domain will automatically 
be applied to the object, until either the object is removed from the domain or the 
policy is disabled. 
Main advantages of Police PPEP are the communication between PEPs, the 
enforcement of authorization policies and the event triggering method. 
Both the authorization and the obligation policies are enforced in the same way. 
Unlike any other system in Police the authorization policies can also be triggered by 
any system event. 
Police PEPs can learn the properties of other managed devices properties or the 
events that occur in other systems via Inter Node Event Messaging and can use this 
information for either obligation policies or authorization policies. For this 
messaging PPEPs do not need to communicate with Policy Server (PDP), this 
protects PDPs from being overloaded.  
Most of the other systems keep their policies only in policy repository and send them 
to PEP when the policy is about to be applied while this time interval the PDPs check 
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the constraints of policies and decide when the policy will be applied. After PDP 
decides to apply the policy it sends it to PEP. In Police the policies are sent to PPEP 
directly when they are created and PPEP makes the decision to apply the policy and 
PPEP checks the constraint of the policy. So PPEP does not need to send the events 
occur in its managed device to PDP.  
The Node Management Interface of PPEP is not designed in detail yet and not 
implemented, it is just simulated. As a future work it will be designed and 
implemented by Hasan Er at Sakarya University. 
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